Here, I figure out why conceptual analysis failed and what concepts are really like.* [ *Based on: “The Failure of Analysis and the Nature of Concepts,” pp. 51-76 in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, ed. Chris Daly (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).]
How do your views on the resolution of the Sorites Paradox fit into this scheme? Would you say that heapness is a concept with fuzzy boundaries, or that the word “heap” ambiguously denotes many precise concepts?
Hence, people are coming constantly talking past each other. When we use the same word, we are only very approximately thinking the same idea.
How do your views on the resolution of the Sorites Paradox fit into this scheme? Would you say that heapness is a concept with fuzzy boundaries, or that the word “heap” ambiguously denotes many precise concepts?
What is the origin of the Jacques-Louis David conglomeration of images?