Here, I summarize what people have said about the state and why most of it is dumb and wrong. This is like a summary of a summary of my views on authority. [ * Based on: “The State” in Central Issues of Philosophy, ed. John Shand (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 257-74. ]
Is it possible that the An-Cap ideal of competing security agencies and courts could devolve into competing warlords? This seems to be the case in Somalia and most of Afghanistan. On an individual level, I might want to hire the security agency that would take my side, right or wrong.
The state “make[s] all sorts of laws that are not in fact necessary for maintaining social order.” But some of these laws may be necessary for achieving other objectives that are good enough to outweigh their negative consequences. Even if not, the conclusion is that one has no obligation to obey *some* of the state’s laws, not that the state is totally illegitimate. The “millions of law-violations every year” that have been occurring have not completely undermined social order, but many of them may have weakened social order enough to make them wrong. (Perhaps few laws are strictly *necessary* for maintaining social order, but a law’s *positively contributing* to maintaining social order will be enough to legitimize it, unless it has some very bad side-effects. Social order/disorder is not white/black, but a matter of degree.)
Do you meet many people who think there is some kind of a 'duty' to obey laws? For example, i know a number of people who are fine with stealing, as long as the victim is someone rich and uncharismatic like (the shareholders of) a big profitable corporation. Even more are five with 'victimless crimes' like using banned drugs. On the other hand, i don't think I've ever met anyone who thinks you have to obey all laws all the time.
I agree with your critique, but I don’t think your proposed solution works either—I don’t know the proper terminology offhand, but there are evidently monopolistic tendencies/negative feedback loops inherent in fully unregulated capitalism which renders non(or minimally)-coercive states based on this temporary at best. Even among a benignly-intentioned collection of private companies, collective force can still be exercised by “Moloch,” to use Scott Alexander’s anthropomorphism.
The answer to the final question is implicit in the beginning of the essay. A government does things that private individuals are not entitled to do and it is taken for granted that it is entitled to do them. A private rights enforcement agency is viewed and treated as having the same rights as a private individual. For details see Chapter 52 of _The Machinery of Freedom_: http://www.daviddfriedman.com/The_Machinery_of_Freedom_.pdf
Have you had any thoughts about how your thoughts about political authority might transition to your thoughts about parental authority? I know these are different relationships, but it does seem strange nonetheless that parents--just in virtue of being biologically connected to their children in the appropriate way--can effectively dictate all matters of a child’s life with few exceptions.
Of Michael Huemer's two questions at the end, are either of them really a dichotomy?
"Coerciveness vs. voluntariness": aren't the voluntary contracts underpinned eventually by an enforcement agency, by coercion?
"Monopoly vs. competition": hasn't Michael's arbitration between arbitrators argument, aswell as several commentators (eg. Mike, Nick) here on warlords (and a tendency of capitalism) suggested that competition should or even does collapse into monopoly?
Bizarrely, Antarctica dominates a section of this article. A casual search on migrants suggests there are perhaps 280m migrants, or 3.5% of the world's population, and yet Antarctica manages a population of just 0.0013m to 0.0051m depending on the season. Of these, almost all of them appear to be research scientists. Far from it being an An-Cap haven for the likes of Ayn Rand, it's one for government-grant-seeking moochers.
The "breaking laws/becoming a philosophy professor" analogy is cute but flawed. The point is that many laws are there to stop behaviours that would be widespread if those laws were not in place. If there were no law against theft, theft would be so commonplace that property rights would collapse (something that you of all people should care deeply about). Conversely, most people have no desire to become philosophy professors, so we don't need a law to prevent people doing it.
I think you forgot to mention the most obvious reason for a coercive state, at least for an economist, exploiting positive and mitigating negative externalities. If the benefit of me doing X has a cost on you that I do not internalize (i.e., pollution) then I should pay a tax for doing X (called a Pigovian tax).
Now, you can say: the private parties can bargain among each other (i.e., you can pay me not to do X whenever the cost to you of me doing X exceeds my benefit), which is the Coase theorem. However, it is well-known that for the Coase theorem to apply transaction costs must be low enough, which is a special case (i.e., free-rider issues among many contacting parties, financial frictions and so on).
The above argument does not establish that the current state intervenes enough or should intervene more, but only that there is a scope for intervention in some limited circumstances that has nothing to do (I think) with some of the other reasons you discussed.
Isn’t the version of contractarianism that is refuted here refuted not by the falseness of its principles, but due to the fact that its principles are nowhere genuinely implemented? If social arrangements actually did require the consent of the governed, so that “I do not consent” had some significance, things might resemble the ancap ideal. But somehow most who endorse contractarianism try to use it to defend the status quo. Narveson is an exception, I think.
Many persons find the idea of basing authority on genuine consent absurd. Its advocates would probably admit it is somewhat speculative. Even good ideas can be implemented badly. But instead of dismissing such ideas, why not allow some space for small scale experimentation? The charter city idea is a baby step in this direction. Maybe Prospera will give us some relevant data.
Social technology seems unusual among technologies in that the entrenched interests that have to most to lose from beneficial innovations are in charge of making them, or at least acting as gatekeepers. It is tempting to think that most social progress happens in spite of the efforts of politicians and bureaucrats who claim to seek the public good. This forces us to decide whether we accept the public servant idea of the state, or opt for a model more in line with public choice theory. How do we open a space for innovation?
Is it possible that the An-Cap ideal of competing security agencies and courts could devolve into competing warlords? This seems to be the case in Somalia and most of Afghanistan. On an individual level, I might want to hire the security agency that would take my side, right or wrong.
The state “make[s] all sorts of laws that are not in fact necessary for maintaining social order.” But some of these laws may be necessary for achieving other objectives that are good enough to outweigh their negative consequences. Even if not, the conclusion is that one has no obligation to obey *some* of the state’s laws, not that the state is totally illegitimate. The “millions of law-violations every year” that have been occurring have not completely undermined social order, but many of them may have weakened social order enough to make them wrong. (Perhaps few laws are strictly *necessary* for maintaining social order, but a law’s *positively contributing* to maintaining social order will be enough to legitimize it, unless it has some very bad side-effects. Social order/disorder is not white/black, but a matter of degree.)
Do you meet many people who think there is some kind of a 'duty' to obey laws? For example, i know a number of people who are fine with stealing, as long as the victim is someone rich and uncharismatic like (the shareholders of) a big profitable corporation. Even more are five with 'victimless crimes' like using banned drugs. On the other hand, i don't think I've ever met anyone who thinks you have to obey all laws all the time.
I agree with your critique, but I don’t think your proposed solution works either—I don’t know the proper terminology offhand, but there are evidently monopolistic tendencies/negative feedback loops inherent in fully unregulated capitalism which renders non(or minimally)-coercive states based on this temporary at best. Even among a benignly-intentioned collection of private companies, collective force can still be exercised by “Moloch,” to use Scott Alexander’s anthropomorphism.
The answer to the final question is implicit in the beginning of the essay. A government does things that private individuals are not entitled to do and it is taken for granted that it is entitled to do them. A private rights enforcement agency is viewed and treated as having the same rights as a private individual. For details see Chapter 52 of _The Machinery of Freedom_: http://www.daviddfriedman.com/The_Machinery_of_Freedom_.pdf
Yeah that sounds great but does it actually work in practice? Can you name a few an-cap states that have worked well, either current or in history?
Have you had any thoughts about how your thoughts about political authority might transition to your thoughts about parental authority? I know these are different relationships, but it does seem strange nonetheless that parents--just in virtue of being biologically connected to their children in the appropriate way--can effectively dictate all matters of a child’s life with few exceptions.
Of Michael Huemer's two questions at the end, are either of them really a dichotomy?
"Coerciveness vs. voluntariness": aren't the voluntary contracts underpinned eventually by an enforcement agency, by coercion?
"Monopoly vs. competition": hasn't Michael's arbitration between arbitrators argument, aswell as several commentators (eg. Mike, Nick) here on warlords (and a tendency of capitalism) suggested that competition should or even does collapse into monopoly?
Bizarrely, Antarctica dominates a section of this article. A casual search on migrants suggests there are perhaps 280m migrants, or 3.5% of the world's population, and yet Antarctica manages a population of just 0.0013m to 0.0051m depending on the season. Of these, almost all of them appear to be research scientists. Far from it being an An-Cap haven for the likes of Ayn Rand, it's one for government-grant-seeking moochers.
The "breaking laws/becoming a philosophy professor" analogy is cute but flawed. The point is that many laws are there to stop behaviours that would be widespread if those laws were not in place. If there were no law against theft, theft would be so commonplace that property rights would collapse (something that you of all people should care deeply about). Conversely, most people have no desire to become philosophy professors, so we don't need a law to prevent people doing it.
I think you forgot to mention the most obvious reason for a coercive state, at least for an economist, exploiting positive and mitigating negative externalities. If the benefit of me doing X has a cost on you that I do not internalize (i.e., pollution) then I should pay a tax for doing X (called a Pigovian tax).
Now, you can say: the private parties can bargain among each other (i.e., you can pay me not to do X whenever the cost to you of me doing X exceeds my benefit), which is the Coase theorem. However, it is well-known that for the Coase theorem to apply transaction costs must be low enough, which is a special case (i.e., free-rider issues among many contacting parties, financial frictions and so on).
The above argument does not establish that the current state intervenes enough or should intervene more, but only that there is a scope for intervention in some limited circumstances that has nothing to do (I think) with some of the other reasons you discussed.
Tell me why I am wrong?
Isn’t the version of contractarianism that is refuted here refuted not by the falseness of its principles, but due to the fact that its principles are nowhere genuinely implemented? If social arrangements actually did require the consent of the governed, so that “I do not consent” had some significance, things might resemble the ancap ideal. But somehow most who endorse contractarianism try to use it to defend the status quo. Narveson is an exception, I think.
Many persons find the idea of basing authority on genuine consent absurd. Its advocates would probably admit it is somewhat speculative. Even good ideas can be implemented badly. But instead of dismissing such ideas, why not allow some space for small scale experimentation? The charter city idea is a baby step in this direction. Maybe Prospera will give us some relevant data.
Social technology seems unusual among technologies in that the entrenched interests that have to most to lose from beneficial innovations are in charge of making them, or at least acting as gatekeepers. It is tempting to think that most social progress happens in spite of the efforts of politicians and bureaucrats who claim to seek the public good. This forces us to decide whether we accept the public servant idea of the state, or opt for a model more in line with public choice theory. How do we open a space for innovation?