Here, I make problems for metaethical views that Peter Singer used to somewhat endorse.* [* From “Singer’s Unstable Metaethics” in Peter Singer Under Fire, ed. Jeffrey Schaler (Open Court, 2009), pp. 359-79.] I. Singer’s Views Ethics Peter Singer is the most famous living ethicist. He’s known for defending preference utilitarianism, the view that the right action is always the action that maximizes the quantity of preference-satisfaction in the universe.
If you're going to go after Peter Singer's former metaethics, you might as well be clear about what those were and directly engage with the specific brand of non-cognitivism he accepted since the different versions of it have different problems. He accepted Hare's universal prescriptivism—something you kind of acknowledge when you say, "This is the view that moral statements function... as disguised imperatives, or something like that" and that "stealing is wrong" is similar to “Don’t steal!”
When you hone in on universal prescriptivism as Singer's metaethics, it's not surprising that he thought consistency mattered. For Hare, and previously Singer, moral claims are prescriptions which imply principles with consistency requirements. So, "don't steal" isn't just an isolated claim with no other implications. Supposedly "don't steal" implies a moral principle which those who say "don't steal" commit themselves to, and must follow to all its logical conclusions.
It's also not surprising that Singer's ethics were revisionary. "Famine, Affluence and Morality" and "Animal Liberation" both show how universal prescription can be revisionary. In "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Singer argues that we all accept that it is wrong to let a child drown in a shallow pond. He says there is a principle linked with this--"if you can prevent something bad from happening...." etc--and that this principle commits us to saving far away lives too.
In "Animal Liberation," Singer says most of us are against racism and sexism, and that the principle underlying this--supposedly the equal consideration of interests principle--commits us to anti-speciesism as well. So, universal prescriptivism can be revisionary by claiming that the seemingly non-controversial moral prescriptions we all make imply our commitment to principles which have radical implications when we follow them to their logical ends.
If we believe in universal prescriptivism, one way out of this is through what Hare called "fanaticism." Someone can say "actually I don't prescribe that we must save children from drowning in shallow ponds, so it is consistent for me not to donate to charities" or "actually I don't prescribe against racism, so it is consistent for me to be speciesist." When he was a universal prescriptivist, Singer would have nothing to say to fanatics like this, so long as they were being sincere.
You make a good point about morally relevant factors. For non-cognitivists, there are no factors which are objectively morally relevant. But I suppose Singer as universal prescriptivist would have tried to show that other prescriptions we make and thus principles we accept imply that distance is not morally relevant, or something like this, so it might still have been a coherent concept for him back them.
I don't know much about Singer's former Humeanism, so I don't know exactly how that fits in here. Maybe he thought our emotions guide which prescriptions we make and thus the principles we commit ourselves to. So, for someone to prescribe that it's wrong to be racist, and therefore commit themselves to anti-speciesism, they would first need to have an emotional reaction against racism. If they didn't have that emotional reaction, and thus didn't prescribe against racism, Singer would not have been able to commit them to anti-speciesism.
However, Humean Singer might only have needed emotions as a foothold into an initial prescription, which would then commit the prescriber into a principle which required them to behave in certain ways even when they didn't have the relevant emotions. In other words, universal prescriptivist Singer might not need the anti-racist to have an anti-speciesist feeling as well for them to be committed to anti-speciesism. The emotional feeling against racism commits someone to the equal consideration of interests principle, supposedly, which then logically commits them to anti-speciesism even if they don't have any negative feelings about animals being harmed. Then again, Singer as Humean should have recognized that even if you manage to logically commit an anti-racist to anti-speciesism, they aren't actually going to act on that commitment if they don't have a feeling motivating them to avoid harming animals. And, again, I'm just speculating because I'm not very familiar with what Humeanism meant to Singer.
Universal prescriptivism is false, so Singer was right to abandon it. However, it's interesting that he hasn't formally disavowed his previous arguments in Famine, Affluence and Morality and Animal Liberation which clearly rest on universal prescriptivist foundations. If it is wrong to exploit animals and wrong to let faraway children suffer, this is not because of our prescriptions which imply principles which we commit ourselves to and must follow to their logical conclusions. Singer needs to make new arguments now.
https://fantasticanachronism.com/2022/10/10/against-effective-altruism/ , I think lots of the EA types etc. want to commit themselves to something like moral realism, because they like the kind of force moral arguments have, the weird irreducible normativity or stance independence or action guidingness etc. but at the same time they feel uncomfortable with how spooky and magical these properties seem, so they invent some sort of weird complicated meta ethical theory that lets them have their cake and eat it too, as opposed to becoming intuitionists or error theorists, who both seem to take moral utterances at something close to face value.
I'm not sure I'm convinced of the tension. It seems to require that we identify my emotional attitude about something with my immediate gut level emotional response.
I mean I often have feelings about my feelings. For instance, I might feel that it would be desierable for me to like Shakespeare more and marvel movies or porn less (I don't but someone might). Indeed, I might feel that strongly enough that I actually do watch more plays by Shakespeare and less marvel movies even though the immediate emotional reaction I feel in response to those viewings doesn't change. I don't think that is somehow in tension with me being a non-cognitivist analog about the value of art..it just requires that we don't identify my emotional reaction with my immediate emotional reaction (it includes feelings as the result of meta-cognition as well).
Seems like a similar kind of thing resolves the tension with Singer. Sure, he may not have the same immediate reaction to not donating as he does to murder but I don't see why that immediate reaction is the right thing to look at (his feeling that it's better to treat them simarly is also part of his emotional attitude).
Peter Singer moved decisively away from non-cognitivism and preference utilitarianism - see particularly the afterword to the 2011 edition of The Expanding Circle, but also The Point of View of The Universe and his appearance on the 80,000 hour podcast. The later Singer would agree with you that non-cognitivism is problematic and he saw it is a wrong turn in the history of philosophical ethics.
Rather than donate during life, leave it in your will. That way, you minimise the risk of running out of money in old age. To increase the 'morality' of this, aim to increase wealth during life.
How do you feel about copyright, IP law? How do you view AI art generators or any AI that is trained on other peoples work whether its copyrighted or not? Do you consider AI art theft, or wrong, or as ok?
Sorry if you have a post somewhere about about IP, j couldnt find it
Singer says that we should not rely on ethical intuitions about concrete cases, because these are easily biased, i.e., influenced by morally irrelevant factors. -- First, we need to clean out our biases by recognizing them, understand their origins, and shine a light on them until they disappear. Then morally irrevelant factors are no longer a factor.
Bestiality is avoided because the animal can't consent.
Failing to donate to charity so that your neighbors starve to death is a direct reason they died, so yes, it's like murder.
Doing things to create more satisfaction for yourself is exactly why we do things. Charity, school, religion, sex, moving into a more comfortable position --- all these things create happiness now or in the future.
You don't do anything if it doesn't somehow make you feel better. Sacrificing your happiness for another person's happiness also results in your feeling better than bad. Even choosing to feel bad can be traced ultimately to wanting to feel good. Understanding something that doing something makes more sense than not doing it, while there are no evident feelings of "good" contributes to your feeling good. Even a murderer thinks killing a person will make them feel better.
Allowing infanticide is a good thing. Forcing someone to live in extreme pain or discomfort is bad. Stopping that unfortunate life to avoid this feels better to you and them.
Having moral beliefs --- even things you "believe" in without having thought them through is bad. Making decisions being affected by moral belief biases is bad.
Being mindful of the inside and outside perspectives and the continuity between them results in disolving biases, making it easier to truthfully decide and do things.
Donating to famine relief even when doing so obviously doesn’t increase your own overall desire-satisfaction --- but does not so obviously increase our overall desire-satisfaction.
We don't do ANYTHING that feels discernably bad unless there's the hope of feeling good in the future, e.g., religion.
There are no actions that are independent of our desire.
Total mindfulness increases both reason and intuition, and allows one to work with the other.
Lol I don’t think you get non-cognitivism. You are making elementary mistakes.
“But if there are no moral facts and no right or wrong desires, then there’s nothing wrong with inconsistent desires.”
Notice that “right or wrong desires” will also get a non-cognitivist reading. A non-cognitivist will say “of course there can be right desires - right desirers are just what our first order ethical theory promotes.”
You seem to think that non-cognitivism implies “everything goes” style relativism, which is a mistake I and many undergrads made back in the day.
« On the non-cognitivist view, there are no ethical facts, only subjective preferences. There is no meaning or value in the universe.»
Lol no such implication from non-cognitivist views.
I mean if non-cognitivism had such implications, it would be a non-starter for anyone with non-relativistic views - not just Singer. So there is no point in pointing out how it clashes with Singer’s views because it would clash with most views.
If you're going to go after Peter Singer's former metaethics, you might as well be clear about what those were and directly engage with the specific brand of non-cognitivism he accepted since the different versions of it have different problems. He accepted Hare's universal prescriptivism—something you kind of acknowledge when you say, "This is the view that moral statements function... as disguised imperatives, or something like that" and that "stealing is wrong" is similar to “Don’t steal!”
When you hone in on universal prescriptivism as Singer's metaethics, it's not surprising that he thought consistency mattered. For Hare, and previously Singer, moral claims are prescriptions which imply principles with consistency requirements. So, "don't steal" isn't just an isolated claim with no other implications. Supposedly "don't steal" implies a moral principle which those who say "don't steal" commit themselves to, and must follow to all its logical conclusions.
It's also not surprising that Singer's ethics were revisionary. "Famine, Affluence and Morality" and "Animal Liberation" both show how universal prescription can be revisionary. In "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Singer argues that we all accept that it is wrong to let a child drown in a shallow pond. He says there is a principle linked with this--"if you can prevent something bad from happening...." etc--and that this principle commits us to saving far away lives too.
In "Animal Liberation," Singer says most of us are against racism and sexism, and that the principle underlying this--supposedly the equal consideration of interests principle--commits us to anti-speciesism as well. So, universal prescriptivism can be revisionary by claiming that the seemingly non-controversial moral prescriptions we all make imply our commitment to principles which have radical implications when we follow them to their logical ends.
If we believe in universal prescriptivism, one way out of this is through what Hare called "fanaticism." Someone can say "actually I don't prescribe that we must save children from drowning in shallow ponds, so it is consistent for me not to donate to charities" or "actually I don't prescribe against racism, so it is consistent for me to be speciesist." When he was a universal prescriptivist, Singer would have nothing to say to fanatics like this, so long as they were being sincere.
You make a good point about morally relevant factors. For non-cognitivists, there are no factors which are objectively morally relevant. But I suppose Singer as universal prescriptivist would have tried to show that other prescriptions we make and thus principles we accept imply that distance is not morally relevant, or something like this, so it might still have been a coherent concept for him back them.
I don't know much about Singer's former Humeanism, so I don't know exactly how that fits in here. Maybe he thought our emotions guide which prescriptions we make and thus the principles we commit ourselves to. So, for someone to prescribe that it's wrong to be racist, and therefore commit themselves to anti-speciesism, they would first need to have an emotional reaction against racism. If they didn't have that emotional reaction, and thus didn't prescribe against racism, Singer would not have been able to commit them to anti-speciesism.
However, Humean Singer might only have needed emotions as a foothold into an initial prescription, which would then commit the prescriber into a principle which required them to behave in certain ways even when they didn't have the relevant emotions. In other words, universal prescriptivist Singer might not need the anti-racist to have an anti-speciesist feeling as well for them to be committed to anti-speciesism. The emotional feeling against racism commits someone to the equal consideration of interests principle, supposedly, which then logically commits them to anti-speciesism even if they don't have any negative feelings about animals being harmed. Then again, Singer as Humean should have recognized that even if you manage to logically commit an anti-racist to anti-speciesism, they aren't actually going to act on that commitment if they don't have a feeling motivating them to avoid harming animals. And, again, I'm just speculating because I'm not very familiar with what Humeanism meant to Singer.
Universal prescriptivism is false, so Singer was right to abandon it. However, it's interesting that he hasn't formally disavowed his previous arguments in Famine, Affluence and Morality and Animal Liberation which clearly rest on universal prescriptivist foundations. If it is wrong to exploit animals and wrong to let faraway children suffer, this is not because of our prescriptions which imply principles which we commit ourselves to and must follow to their logical conclusions. Singer needs to make new arguments now.
https://fantasticanachronism.com/2022/10/10/against-effective-altruism/ , I think lots of the EA types etc. want to commit themselves to something like moral realism, because they like the kind of force moral arguments have, the weird irreducible normativity or stance independence or action guidingness etc. but at the same time they feel uncomfortable with how spooky and magical these properties seem, so they invent some sort of weird complicated meta ethical theory that lets them have their cake and eat it too, as opposed to becoming intuitionists or error theorists, who both seem to take moral utterances at something close to face value.
I'm not sure I'm convinced of the tension. It seems to require that we identify my emotional attitude about something with my immediate gut level emotional response.
I mean I often have feelings about my feelings. For instance, I might feel that it would be desierable for me to like Shakespeare more and marvel movies or porn less (I don't but someone might). Indeed, I might feel that strongly enough that I actually do watch more plays by Shakespeare and less marvel movies even though the immediate emotional reaction I feel in response to those viewings doesn't change. I don't think that is somehow in tension with me being a non-cognitivist analog about the value of art..it just requires that we don't identify my emotional reaction with my immediate emotional reaction (it includes feelings as the result of meta-cognition as well).
Seems like a similar kind of thing resolves the tension with Singer. Sure, he may not have the same immediate reaction to not donating as he does to murder but I don't see why that immediate reaction is the right thing to look at (his feeling that it's better to treat them simarly is also part of his emotional attitude).
Didn't Singer change to Hedonistic Utilitarianism?
Also who cares? I don't think many utilitarian theorists care Singer thinks.
Peter Singer moved decisively away from non-cognitivism and preference utilitarianism - see particularly the afterword to the 2011 edition of The Expanding Circle, but also The Point of View of The Universe and his appearance on the 80,000 hour podcast. The later Singer would agree with you that non-cognitivism is problematic and he saw it is a wrong turn in the history of philosophical ethics.
Rather than donate during life, leave it in your will. That way, you minimise the risk of running out of money in old age. To increase the 'morality' of this, aim to increase wealth during life.
Quedtion that is unrelated to this post:
How do you feel about copyright, IP law? How do you view AI art generators or any AI that is trained on other peoples work whether its copyrighted or not? Do you consider AI art theft, or wrong, or as ok?
Sorry if you have a post somewhere about about IP, j couldnt find it
One man's reductio is another man's modus ponens.
Singer says that we should not rely on ethical intuitions about concrete cases, because these are easily biased, i.e., influenced by morally irrelevant factors. -- First, we need to clean out our biases by recognizing them, understand their origins, and shine a light on them until they disappear. Then morally irrevelant factors are no longer a factor.
Bestiality is avoided because the animal can't consent.
Failing to donate to charity so that your neighbors starve to death is a direct reason they died, so yes, it's like murder.
Doing things to create more satisfaction for yourself is exactly why we do things. Charity, school, religion, sex, moving into a more comfortable position --- all these things create happiness now or in the future.
You don't do anything if it doesn't somehow make you feel better. Sacrificing your happiness for another person's happiness also results in your feeling better than bad. Even choosing to feel bad can be traced ultimately to wanting to feel good. Understanding something that doing something makes more sense than not doing it, while there are no evident feelings of "good" contributes to your feeling good. Even a murderer thinks killing a person will make them feel better.
Allowing infanticide is a good thing. Forcing someone to live in extreme pain or discomfort is bad. Stopping that unfortunate life to avoid this feels better to you and them.
Having moral beliefs --- even things you "believe" in without having thought them through is bad. Making decisions being affected by moral belief biases is bad.
Being mindful of the inside and outside perspectives and the continuity between them results in disolving biases, making it easier to truthfully decide and do things.
Donating to famine relief even when doing so obviously doesn’t increase your own overall desire-satisfaction --- but does not so obviously increase our overall desire-satisfaction.
We don't do ANYTHING that feels discernably bad unless there's the hope of feeling good in the future, e.g., religion.
There are no actions that are independent of our desire.
Total mindfulness increases both reason and intuition, and allows one to work with the other.
Lol I don’t think you get non-cognitivism. You are making elementary mistakes.
“But if there are no moral facts and no right or wrong desires, then there’s nothing wrong with inconsistent desires.”
Notice that “right or wrong desires” will also get a non-cognitivist reading. A non-cognitivist will say “of course there can be right desires - right desirers are just what our first order ethical theory promotes.”
You seem to think that non-cognitivism implies “everything goes” style relativism, which is a mistake I and many undergrads made back in the day.
« On the non-cognitivist view, there are no ethical facts, only subjective preferences. There is no meaning or value in the universe.»
Lol no such implication from non-cognitivist views.
I mean if non-cognitivism had such implications, it would be a non-starter for anyone with non-relativistic views - not just Singer. So there is no point in pointing out how it clashes with Singer’s views because it would clash with most views.
Bruh, I don’t think you get non-cognitivism.