Thanks to Stephen for his stimulating post. Three comments:
(1)
First, I think responsibility comes in degrees. Some acts are more or less responsible than others. I assume, then, that Stephen’s view would be that no person is *to any degree* responsible for *anything*.
This implies, for example, that Stephen Kershnar is no more responsible for the content of this post than Hilary Clinton is; Hitler was no more responsible for World War II than Moo Deng is; etc. But that is absurd.
Stephen mentions the objection that “we intuitively know that people are responsible even if we can’t explain why.” His response is that the objector “still has to provide a responsibility-foundation or explain why one isn’t needed.” Why would the objector have to do that? The objection says that we know there is responsibility without being able to explain why; so why would the objector have to explain why?
I guess Stephen’s view is that you can’t know intuitively that a conclusion is wrong without knowing what is wrong with the argument? But in fact, that is very common. Consider arguments that motion is impossible, that 1=2, that no one ever knows anything, etc. Philosophers are experts at constructing arguments with absurd conclusions where you don’t know what is wrong with them. It’s practically our job description. Accepting the conclusions of all such arguments is not a way of being rational; it’s a way of losing your mind.
(2)
I am not convinced of Principle 1,
"If a person is responsible for a choice, then the choice flowed from his psychology, and he is responsible for the psychology."
Why can’t a person make a radically free choice, one that is just caused by the agent?
Stephen asks us to consider a choice that is caused by a random quantum event. Surely the person is not responsible for that choice. But that isn’t a free choice. A free choice must be caused by the agent (by the mind/the soul/consciousness), not a random quantum event of some non-conscious particle.
(3)
I’m not convinced of Principle 2,
"If a person is responsible for a psychology, then he chose it and is responsible for the choice."
A person can be responsible for his psychology in virtue of
a. Having made other choices that led to his having that psychology, without having chosen the psychology itself. According to Aristotle, one becomes virtuous by acting as a virtuous person would on many occasions, over a long period of time. If that happens, one would be responsible for one’s virtue, though one need not ever have chosen the virtue.
b. Having failed to do anything to change his psychology, when he could have. Suppose that I never developed virtue because I never did any of the virtuous acts that would have developed it. So I remain with the psychological traits that resulted from a combination of genetic propensities and social influences, which I did not choose. I’m still responsible for having those traits because I failed to change them. Of course, this is only true if I could have changed them, which, in my view, requires some kind of libertarian free will (see (2) above).
Thank you so much for allowing me to participate in your site.
You ask why can’t a person make a radically free choice, one that is just caused by the agent? Here is my argument against this claim. It is a type of luck argument.
(P1) If libertarianism is true, then a person is morally responsible because he can choose differently in the actual world and a relevant possible world.
Assumption #1: Psychology. The worlds are identical until the time of decision. They include the same mental states (for example, beliefs, desires, intentions, and values) and way of reasoning up until the moment before he chooses.
(P2) If a person is morally responsible because he can choose differently in the actual world and a relevant possible world, then he is morally responsible because his choice is random or arbitrary (that is, a matter of luck).
Assumption #2: No Explanation. In this case, nothing about the person’s psychology explains why he chooses one way rather than another.
(C1) Hence, if libertarianism is true, then a person is morally responsible because his choice is random or arbitrary. [(P1), (P2)]
To how this argument works, consider the case in which a businessman makes a choice, and God then rolls back the scenario to the point in time before he chooses 1,000 times. The businessman then chooses again and again. 500 times, the businessman made the right choice (for example, he stops teenagers from cruelly making fun of a homeless man). 500 times he makes the wrong choice (for example, he ignores the cruelty and continues walking to work). Nothing about the businessman’s psychology explains why he chose differently in the actual world and in identical possible worlds.
If the businessman’s psychology were to explain why he made the right choice, but not the wrong choice, then – in cases in which he is responsible – he would do the right thing 100% of the time.
This case shows that the following is true. If a person is morally responsible for a choice, then the choice flowed from his psychology and he is responsible for the psychology.
I claim that this is true even if he is, and only is, a soul. I also claim that this is true even if nothing determines his choice.
Thanks again including me and for the great thoughts,
This is a fantastic set of arguments. Thank you both. Two (sets of related) questions for Huemer: 1) On your view, is it a free choice rather than a mind/soul/consciousness that is the basic responsibility-maker? 2) Am I right to assume that a mind, for you, is not what Kershnar is calling a psychology? If so, is this important for this argument?
And two (sets) for Kershnar: A) Could you say more about the basic or unanalyzable status of responsibility? B) Why are your two candidates (choice and psychology) the only plausible ones? What about an agent? Or even, say, something like what one might call the Form of Responsibility (if an action or person exemplifies/reflects/matches this form, then it or s/he is responsible)? Why do the candidates for the basic responsibility-maker have to 'belong' to the responsible agent in some way? Is it simply too implausible that something outside an agent make an agent responsible?
Please forgive the simple questions; this is a wonderful and stimulating post, and I appreciate both Kershnar's argument and Huemer's reply.
I guess a free choice is a basic responsibility-maker, but a free choice requires a mind/soul/consciousness that causes the choice.
The mind, or the soul, is a non-material entity that is a component of the person, that is the locus of conscious experiences, and that determines personal identity. In my view, the best account of free will requires that we have such souls, and that they causally intervene in the physical world. Most people in philosophy of mind deny that there are such things, and many also deny free will. Stephen probably also assumes that there is no soul.
I think the property responsibility is similar to the property yellow. We know what yellow is, but we cannot analyze it. That is, we cannot break it down into more basic properties. This is especially true if yellow is a unique type of experience.
The idea behind choice and psychology being the only plausible candidates for a basic responsibility-maker rests on three ideas. First, responsibility is accountability. Second, a person is responsible for being or doing something – or having the capacity to do them – and not just responsibility simpliciter. Third, the basic responsibility-maker is something that a person controls or that connects to him in the right way, specifically, closely connects to his mental states. Other than choice and psychology, I can’t think of anything that satisfies these conditions and that does so directly, that is, without going through a choice or a psychology.
The thought that something outside of a person cannot make him responsible rests on the notion that responsibility is something that a person has to do for himself. For example, someone cannot control my control. Similarly, someone cannot have my thoughts for me.
This post seems to assume a narrow and univocal view of what responsibility is (briefly, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, or at least the underlying state that calls for praise or blame). That seems questionable.
Responsibility consists also of the willingness to try to bring success, and clean up after failure. If I am responsible for something, and things get out of hand, I am the one who is on the hook to clean things up, or pay compensation to those harmed, or if none of that is possible, to provide what reconciliation is possible. Whether this is just and whether it is the case are different things. The post seems to assume I can only be responsible if it is just for me to hold the bag.
Responsibility is a social phenomenon, part of the game we are playing. Persons can seek responsibility if they want the authority that comes with it. They can seek to avoid it if there is no such authority, and only liability and blame. One can volunteer for it, claiming responsibility. And others might accept the claim or reject it. Social norms and precedents have emerged that give people an idea about who is responsible for what and when, how to gain responsibility and how to shuck it.
So what is a responsibility maker? If agreement is unanimous regarding who is responsible for what, does it matter? It is a social game. What if there is disagreement about who is responsible? People either work it out informally or move it to a formal legal claim.
Responsibility is related to legal liability, but not identical. Responsibility means holding the bag when things go bad. And someone always gets left holding the bag, even if it is just the victim.
This might indicate that the responsibility maker is a bit arbitrary, on,y very loosely connected to justice. Someone can be responsible for something without being blameworthy if it ends badly. It just means they are the person who must clean up the mess.
It is possible to get rid of responsibility in most cases. People often do not want to, because it comes with practical and social costs. Someone who systematically rejected all responsibility would seem likely to end up in a prison or an insane asylum. Even there, they might not be able to escape from some responsibilities. The exception would be if they found a guardian willing to take on their responsibilities for them.
So there are aspects of responsibility. One is blame and praise. Another is being on the hook to prevent or recover from disaster. A third is to be in control of something. Perhaps the discussion would be clearer if we separated these, though it might be difficult.
We could also get into stuff about the self, if “we” choose our psychologies, but I have droned on long enough.
Thanks to Stephen for his stimulating post. Three comments:
(1)
First, I think responsibility comes in degrees. Some acts are more or less responsible than others. I assume, then, that Stephen’s view would be that no person is *to any degree* responsible for *anything*.
This implies, for example, that Stephen Kershnar is no more responsible for the content of this post than Hilary Clinton is; Hitler was no more responsible for World War II than Moo Deng is; etc. But that is absurd.
Stephen mentions the objection that “we intuitively know that people are responsible even if we can’t explain why.” His response is that the objector “still has to provide a responsibility-foundation or explain why one isn’t needed.” Why would the objector have to do that? The objection says that we know there is responsibility without being able to explain why; so why would the objector have to explain why?
I guess Stephen’s view is that you can’t know intuitively that a conclusion is wrong without knowing what is wrong with the argument? But in fact, that is very common. Consider arguments that motion is impossible, that 1=2, that no one ever knows anything, etc. Philosophers are experts at constructing arguments with absurd conclusions where you don’t know what is wrong with them. It’s practically our job description. Accepting the conclusions of all such arguments is not a way of being rational; it’s a way of losing your mind.
(2)
I am not convinced of Principle 1,
"If a person is responsible for a choice, then the choice flowed from his psychology, and he is responsible for the psychology."
Why can’t a person make a radically free choice, one that is just caused by the agent?
Stephen asks us to consider a choice that is caused by a random quantum event. Surely the person is not responsible for that choice. But that isn’t a free choice. A free choice must be caused by the agent (by the mind/the soul/consciousness), not a random quantum event of some non-conscious particle.
(3)
I’m not convinced of Principle 2,
"If a person is responsible for a psychology, then he chose it and is responsible for the choice."
A person can be responsible for his psychology in virtue of
a. Having made other choices that led to his having that psychology, without having chosen the psychology itself. According to Aristotle, one becomes virtuous by acting as a virtuous person would on many occasions, over a long period of time. If that happens, one would be responsible for one’s virtue, though one need not ever have chosen the virtue.
b. Having failed to do anything to change his psychology, when he could have. Suppose that I never developed virtue because I never did any of the virtuous acts that would have developed it. So I remain with the psychological traits that resulted from a combination of genetic propensities and social influences, which I did not choose. I’m still responsible for having those traits because I failed to change them. Of course, this is only true if I could have changed them, which, in my view, requires some kind of libertarian free will (see (2) above).
Michael:
Thank you so much for allowing me to participate in your site.
You ask why can’t a person make a radically free choice, one that is just caused by the agent? Here is my argument against this claim. It is a type of luck argument.
(P1) If libertarianism is true, then a person is morally responsible because he can choose differently in the actual world and a relevant possible world.
Assumption #1: Psychology. The worlds are identical until the time of decision. They include the same mental states (for example, beliefs, desires, intentions, and values) and way of reasoning up until the moment before he chooses.
(P2) If a person is morally responsible because he can choose differently in the actual world and a relevant possible world, then he is morally responsible because his choice is random or arbitrary (that is, a matter of luck).
Assumption #2: No Explanation. In this case, nothing about the person’s psychology explains why he chooses one way rather than another.
(C1) Hence, if libertarianism is true, then a person is morally responsible because his choice is random or arbitrary. [(P1), (P2)]
To how this argument works, consider the case in which a businessman makes a choice, and God then rolls back the scenario to the point in time before he chooses 1,000 times. The businessman then chooses again and again. 500 times, the businessman made the right choice (for example, he stops teenagers from cruelly making fun of a homeless man). 500 times he makes the wrong choice (for example, he ignores the cruelty and continues walking to work). Nothing about the businessman’s psychology explains why he chose differently in the actual world and in identical possible worlds.
If the businessman’s psychology were to explain why he made the right choice, but not the wrong choice, then – in cases in which he is responsible – he would do the right thing 100% of the time.
This case shows that the following is true. If a person is morally responsible for a choice, then the choice flowed from his psychology and he is responsible for the psychology.
I claim that this is true even if he is, and only is, a soul. I also claim that this is true even if nothing determines his choice.
Thanks again including me and for the great thoughts,
Steve K
This is a fantastic set of arguments. Thank you both. Two (sets of related) questions for Huemer: 1) On your view, is it a free choice rather than a mind/soul/consciousness that is the basic responsibility-maker? 2) Am I right to assume that a mind, for you, is not what Kershnar is calling a psychology? If so, is this important for this argument?
And two (sets) for Kershnar: A) Could you say more about the basic or unanalyzable status of responsibility? B) Why are your two candidates (choice and psychology) the only plausible ones? What about an agent? Or even, say, something like what one might call the Form of Responsibility (if an action or person exemplifies/reflects/matches this form, then it or s/he is responsible)? Why do the candidates for the basic responsibility-maker have to 'belong' to the responsible agent in some way? Is it simply too implausible that something outside an agent make an agent responsible?
Please forgive the simple questions; this is a wonderful and stimulating post, and I appreciate both Kershnar's argument and Huemer's reply.
Hi Josh,
I guess a free choice is a basic responsibility-maker, but a free choice requires a mind/soul/consciousness that causes the choice.
The mind, or the soul, is a non-material entity that is a component of the person, that is the locus of conscious experiences, and that determines personal identity. In my view, the best account of free will requires that we have such souls, and that they causally intervene in the physical world. Most people in philosophy of mind deny that there are such things, and many also deny free will. Stephen probably also assumes that there is no soul.
Dear Josh R:
Thank you for your response.
I think the property responsibility is similar to the property yellow. We know what yellow is, but we cannot analyze it. That is, we cannot break it down into more basic properties. This is especially true if yellow is a unique type of experience.
The idea behind choice and psychology being the only plausible candidates for a basic responsibility-maker rests on three ideas. First, responsibility is accountability. Second, a person is responsible for being or doing something – or having the capacity to do them – and not just responsibility simpliciter. Third, the basic responsibility-maker is something that a person controls or that connects to him in the right way, specifically, closely connects to his mental states. Other than choice and psychology, I can’t think of anything that satisfies these conditions and that does so directly, that is, without going through a choice or a psychology.
The thought that something outside of a person cannot make him responsible rests on the notion that responsibility is something that a person has to do for himself. For example, someone cannot control my control. Similarly, someone cannot have my thoughts for me.
Thanks again for the comments, I appreciate them,
Steve Kershnar
This post seems to assume a narrow and univocal view of what responsibility is (briefly, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, or at least the underlying state that calls for praise or blame). That seems questionable.
Responsibility consists also of the willingness to try to bring success, and clean up after failure. If I am responsible for something, and things get out of hand, I am the one who is on the hook to clean things up, or pay compensation to those harmed, or if none of that is possible, to provide what reconciliation is possible. Whether this is just and whether it is the case are different things. The post seems to assume I can only be responsible if it is just for me to hold the bag.
Responsibility is a social phenomenon, part of the game we are playing. Persons can seek responsibility if they want the authority that comes with it. They can seek to avoid it if there is no such authority, and only liability and blame. One can volunteer for it, claiming responsibility. And others might accept the claim or reject it. Social norms and precedents have emerged that give people an idea about who is responsible for what and when, how to gain responsibility and how to shuck it.
So what is a responsibility maker? If agreement is unanimous regarding who is responsible for what, does it matter? It is a social game. What if there is disagreement about who is responsible? People either work it out informally or move it to a formal legal claim.
Responsibility is related to legal liability, but not identical. Responsibility means holding the bag when things go bad. And someone always gets left holding the bag, even if it is just the victim.
This might indicate that the responsibility maker is a bit arbitrary, on,y very loosely connected to justice. Someone can be responsible for something without being blameworthy if it ends badly. It just means they are the person who must clean up the mess.
It is possible to get rid of responsibility in most cases. People often do not want to, because it comes with practical and social costs. Someone who systematically rejected all responsibility would seem likely to end up in a prison or an insane asylum. Even there, they might not be able to escape from some responsibilities. The exception would be if they found a guardian willing to take on their responsibilities for them.
So there are aspects of responsibility. One is blame and praise. Another is being on the hook to prevent or recover from disaster. A third is to be in control of something. Perhaps the discussion would be clearer if we separated these, though it might be difficult.
We could also get into stuff about the self, if “we” choose our psychologies, but I have droned on long enough.