Here, I defend the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism from objections due to John DePoe.* [* Based on: “Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe,” Philosophical Studies 156 (2011): 1-13. Responding to John DePoe’s “Defeating the Self-defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism”,
> In this case, it just seems to me that Norman does have some justification for believing P. If you think that’s not true, then I don’t know why anything at all would be justified.
This is another reason I like PC. I have some "woo woo" friends that believe in psychic phenomena and I have some other friends that are extremely into "Science" in the sense that if there isn't overwhelming evidence for something, then it's a "crackpot" theory and they harshly judge my woo woo friends. I find the PC position much more reasonable. I'm highly skeptical of woo woo stuff exactly because of plenty of what I think are defeaters, but I have no problem exploring these ideas with my woo woo friends and, instead of dismissing them, helping them review potential defeaters, think of experiments, etc. Of course, this isn't any sort of formal argument in favor of PC, but I think that, in addition to the formal arguments that you give, I find that it's _also_ a nicer, easier, and more empathetic way to live.
The borderline pain example is odd. It really seems to be describing just how imperfectly natural language maps onto scalar phenomena.
I think what you'd be unsure about / not "acquainted with" in the middle condition isn't anything about your experience, but rather about whether the English word "pain" is appropriate for describing it. It's like telling me a building's height in meters, and then my being unsure about whether "it's tall": not any uncertainty about the building's height, but linguistic uncertainty about an inherently somewhat arbitrary transform of a scalar dimension into a binary distinction.
I feel like you would gain value from reading about alexothymia, emotional colorblindness;
People with alexothymia can have emotions without knowing or understanding what emotion they have
I have a mild version of it, and it used to be pretty bad (for a variety of reasons): i actually didnt reallize that im basically gay untill last year, despite having tried straight sex (hated it) 9 years ago, and then trying gay sex (which i really like) 3 years ago to now
I had to make a spreadsheet to realize im probably gay, and i never felt gay until i got experience firsthand with other gay men
So, is phenomenal conservatism just a version of evidentialism where E=seemings?
Also, what is the PC view on forgotten evidence cases?
Suppose at t1 I initially form a belief that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1819* on the basis of testimony by my nephew. At a later point t2, I forget that I believed this on the basis of testimony from my nephew.
Subsequent to that, at t3, I learn that my nephew is unreliable with respect to historical facts. But because I forgot that I acquired my belief from my nephew, I retain that belief.
1) It seems that PC would allow retaining the belief at t3 since at t3 it seems to me as if Waterloo was fought in 1819.
2) It seems that I should not retain the belief since forgetting is merely a failure to retrieve information that is still stored in my memory and hence still evidence that, in some sense, I possess, even if I cannot immediately retrieve it at the moment.
> In this case, it just seems to me that Norman does have some justification for believing P. If you think that’s not true, then I don’t know why anything at all would be justified.
This is another reason I like PC. I have some "woo woo" friends that believe in psychic phenomena and I have some other friends that are extremely into "Science" in the sense that if there isn't overwhelming evidence for something, then it's a "crackpot" theory and they harshly judge my woo woo friends. I find the PC position much more reasonable. I'm highly skeptical of woo woo stuff exactly because of plenty of what I think are defeaters, but I have no problem exploring these ideas with my woo woo friends and, instead of dismissing them, helping them review potential defeaters, think of experiments, etc. Of course, this isn't any sort of formal argument in favor of PC, but I think that, in addition to the formal arguments that you give, I find that it's _also_ a nicer, easier, and more empathetic way to live.
The borderline pain example is odd. It really seems to be describing just how imperfectly natural language maps onto scalar phenomena.
I think what you'd be unsure about / not "acquainted with" in the middle condition isn't anything about your experience, but rather about whether the English word "pain" is appropriate for describing it. It's like telling me a building's height in meters, and then my being unsure about whether "it's tall": not any uncertainty about the building's height, but linguistic uncertainty about an inherently somewhat arbitrary transform of a scalar dimension into a binary distinction.
I dont really get this blog post
I feel like you would gain value from reading about alexothymia, emotional colorblindness;
People with alexothymia can have emotions without knowing or understanding what emotion they have
I have a mild version of it, and it used to be pretty bad (for a variety of reasons): i actually didnt reallize that im basically gay untill last year, despite having tried straight sex (hated it) 9 years ago, and then trying gay sex (which i really like) 3 years ago to now
I had to make a spreadsheet to realize im probably gay, and i never felt gay until i got experience firsthand with other gay men
Idk maybe this is relevant
So, is phenomenal conservatism just a version of evidentialism where E=seemings?
Also, what is the PC view on forgotten evidence cases?
Suppose at t1 I initially form a belief that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1819* on the basis of testimony by my nephew. At a later point t2, I forget that I believed this on the basis of testimony from my nephew.
Subsequent to that, at t3, I learn that my nephew is unreliable with respect to historical facts. But because I forgot that I acquired my belief from my nephew, I retain that belief.
1) It seems that PC would allow retaining the belief at t3 since at t3 it seems to me as if Waterloo was fought in 1819.
2) It seems that I should not retain the belief since forgetting is merely a failure to retrieve information that is still stored in my memory and hence still evidence that, in some sense, I possess, even if I cannot immediately retrieve it at the moment.
*Actually it is 1815