Here, I explain how we gain inferential justification, through appearances.* [ *Based on “Inferential Appearances,” pp. 144-60 in Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, ed. Brett Coppenger and Michael Bergmann (Oxford University Press, 2016). ]
Appearances are not beliefs. Are they both propositional? Do they intersect at all? I missed why this matters.
Justification isn’t just having good reasons. It isn’t certainty. I can be justified without being certain, and maybe even uncertain of a justified belief. Justification isn’t having enough confidence to act on a belief. What is it? What do I know about justified beliefs that is different from a lucky educated guess? Or are educated guesses justified?
Regarding the tortoise, what is it an argument seeks to justify? Is it the conclusion alone, or the hypothetical statement “ if premises then conclusion?”
Sigh. I wish I was clearer on a couple of things.
Appearances are not beliefs. Are they both propositional? Do they intersect at all? I missed why this matters.
Justification isn’t just having good reasons. It isn’t certainty. I can be justified without being certain, and maybe even uncertain of a justified belief. Justification isn’t having enough confidence to act on a belief. What is it? What do I know about justified beliefs that is different from a lucky educated guess? Or are educated guesses justified?
Regarding the tortoise, what is it an argument seeks to justify? Is it the conclusion alone, or the hypothetical statement “ if premises then conclusion?”