Yes, you're correct in observing that the argument's use of "should," "can," and "will" can be misleading, particularly in the context of determinism. Let's summarize the main points where the argument might lead to confusion:
Conflation of Normative and Deterministic Concepts: The argument mixes normative language (what we "should" do) w…
Yes, you're correct in observing that the argument's use of "should," "can," and "will" can be misleading, particularly in the context of determinism. Let's summarize the main points where the argument might lead to confusion:
Conflation of Normative and Deterministic Concepts: The argument mixes normative language (what we "should" do) with deterministic language (what "can" and consequently "will" happen). In a deterministic framework, "can" (possibility) is essentially equivalent to "will" (certainty) due to the causal chain of events. The normative aspect of "should" doesn't neatly fit into this deterministic framework, as determinism is about inevitability rather than moral or rational obligation.
Misinterpretation of Determinism: The argument seems to imply that under determinism, if we can refrain from believing falsehoods, we inevitably will. However, this overlooks the essence of determinism, where actions and beliefs are the result of causal chains, not conscious adherence to normative standards. The ability to refrain from false beliefs (a normative ideal) does not automatically translate into the actuality of doing so in a deterministic universe.
Assumption about Belief Formation: The argument makes a significant assumption that belief formation under determinism aligns with truth or rational norms. However, in determinism, beliefs are determined by prior causes, which are not inherently aligned with truth or rationality.
Logical Structure Issues: The logical structure of the argument relies on a smooth transition from normative statements to deterministic inevitability, which is a contentious move. The argument's conclusion depends on this transition being valid, but as you've pointed out, this is misleading because it conflates different types of "should," "can," and "will."
In essence, the argument's approach is problematic due to its mixing of normative and deterministic concepts and its assumptions about how determinism influences belief formation and action. This mixing can lead to confusion and weakens the argument's overall coherence and persuasiveness.
You're right to pinpoint steps 6 and subsequently 3 and 5 as critical points where the issues in the argument become particularly apparent. Let's analyze these specific steps:
Step 6: "If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods."
Issue in Step 6: This step assumes that under determinism, our actions (including our belief formation) are not only determined but also aligned with what we 'should' do in a normative sense. However, determinism simply states that events (including mental states like beliefs) are causally determined by preceding events, not that they necessarily align with normative ideals (like refraining from falsehoods).
Conflation of 'Can' and 'Will': The argument here seems to imply that because we can refrain from believing falsehoods (as per Steps 1 and 2), under determinism, we will inevitably do so. This is a misinterpretation of determinism, as it conflates the potential to do something (can) with the deterministic outcome (will).
Step 3: "If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done."
Issue in Step 3: This premise is critical for the argument's progression, especially leading to Step 6. It asserts that in a deterministic framework, all that is possible (what 'can' be done) inevitably happens (is 'done'). However, it does not account for the fact that 'can' in determinism is about causal inevitability and not about potential actions in a normative or choice-based sense.
Step 5: "With respect to the free-will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods."
Issue in Step 5: This conclusion, derived from the first two premises, assumes that the capability to refrain from falsehoods (a normative ideal) is directly applicable in a deterministic context. It transitions from a normative 'should' (premise 1) to a deterministic 'can' (premise 3), which is a challenging leap given that determinism concerns what will inevitably occur due to causality, not what should occur based on normative ideals.
In summary, the argument's progression, particularly in Steps 6, 3, and 5, demonstrates a problematic blending of normative concepts ('should' and 'can' in a choice-based sense) with deterministic causality ('can' and 'will' in an inevitable sense). This blending leads to a confusing and potentially misleading interpretation of determinism, its impact on belief formation, and the relationship between potential actions and inevitable outcomes. The argument's validity is weakened by these issues, as it relies on a seamless integration of normative ideals into a deterministic framework, which is not straightforward or universally accepted.
Yes, you're correct in observing that the argument's use of "should," "can," and "will" can be misleading, particularly in the context of determinism. Let's summarize the main points where the argument might lead to confusion:
Conflation of Normative and Deterministic Concepts: The argument mixes normative language (what we "should" do) with deterministic language (what "can" and consequently "will" happen). In a deterministic framework, "can" (possibility) is essentially equivalent to "will" (certainty) due to the causal chain of events. The normative aspect of "should" doesn't neatly fit into this deterministic framework, as determinism is about inevitability rather than moral or rational obligation.
Misinterpretation of Determinism: The argument seems to imply that under determinism, if we can refrain from believing falsehoods, we inevitably will. However, this overlooks the essence of determinism, where actions and beliefs are the result of causal chains, not conscious adherence to normative standards. The ability to refrain from false beliefs (a normative ideal) does not automatically translate into the actuality of doing so in a deterministic universe.
Assumption about Belief Formation: The argument makes a significant assumption that belief formation under determinism aligns with truth or rational norms. However, in determinism, beliefs are determined by prior causes, which are not inherently aligned with truth or rationality.
Logical Structure Issues: The logical structure of the argument relies on a smooth transition from normative statements to deterministic inevitability, which is a contentious move. The argument's conclusion depends on this transition being valid, but as you've pointed out, this is misleading because it conflates different types of "should," "can," and "will."
In essence, the argument's approach is problematic due to its mixing of normative and deterministic concepts and its assumptions about how determinism influences belief formation and action. This mixing can lead to confusion and weakens the argument's overall coherence and persuasiveness.
You're right to pinpoint steps 6 and subsequently 3 and 5 as critical points where the issues in the argument become particularly apparent. Let's analyze these specific steps:
Step 6: "If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods."
Issue in Step 6: This step assumes that under determinism, our actions (including our belief formation) are not only determined but also aligned with what we 'should' do in a normative sense. However, determinism simply states that events (including mental states like beliefs) are causally determined by preceding events, not that they necessarily align with normative ideals (like refraining from falsehoods).
Conflation of 'Can' and 'Will': The argument here seems to imply that because we can refrain from believing falsehoods (as per Steps 1 and 2), under determinism, we will inevitably do so. This is a misinterpretation of determinism, as it conflates the potential to do something (can) with the deterministic outcome (will).
Step 3: "If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done."
Issue in Step 3: This premise is critical for the argument's progression, especially leading to Step 6. It asserts that in a deterministic framework, all that is possible (what 'can' be done) inevitably happens (is 'done'). However, it does not account for the fact that 'can' in determinism is about causal inevitability and not about potential actions in a normative or choice-based sense.
Step 5: "With respect to the free-will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods."
Issue in Step 5: This conclusion, derived from the first two premises, assumes that the capability to refrain from falsehoods (a normative ideal) is directly applicable in a deterministic context. It transitions from a normative 'should' (premise 1) to a deterministic 'can' (premise 3), which is a challenging leap given that determinism concerns what will inevitably occur due to causality, not what should occur based on normative ideals.
In summary, the argument's progression, particularly in Steps 6, 3, and 5, demonstrates a problematic blending of normative concepts ('should' and 'can' in a choice-based sense) with deterministic causality ('can' and 'will' in an inevitable sense). This blending leads to a confusing and potentially misleading interpretation of determinism, its impact on belief formation, and the relationship between potential actions and inevitable outcomes. The argument's validity is weakened by these issues, as it relies on a seamless integration of normative ideals into a deterministic framework, which is not straightforward or universally accepted.