“Determinism implies that good epistemic reasons play no role in explaining why one believes determinism itself because they would believe it regardless of whether it was true or not.” My friend Connor asks: Couldn’t the determinist say “Having a good epistemic reason to believe something is part of what deterministically causes us to believe it?”
“Determinism implies that good epistemic reasons play no role in explaining why one believes determinism itself because they would believe it regardless of whether it was true or not.”
My friend Connor asks: Couldn’t the determinist say “Having a good epistemic reason to believe something is part of what deterministically causes us to believe it?”
What Lucas had in mind was a physicalistic version of determinism. So your beliefs would be determined by purely physical processes in your brain, not by "epistemic reasons".
Is a “purely physical process” incapable of acting on good epistemic reasons?
I’m not sure what you mean by that. My friend Connor asks: “Epistemic reasons” are abstract objects, aren’t they? What does that have to do with physicalism?
Well, maybe the case. I wasn't thinkin specificly in that way, but seems to be the conclusion. Because finally what "PublicIntelletuals..." is calling "epistemic reasons" is the determining physical process of the brain. In my comment I was only pointing out that it was absurd.
'Couldn’t the determinist say “Having a good epistemic reason to believe something is part of what deterministically causes us to believe it?”'
This is the fundamental point. Determinism really does mean determinism all the way down, and this is a difficult proposition for many to accept I think.
In that case, everything that anyone believes in is believed with good epistemic reasons, because anything that anyone believes is, in fact, believed by deterministic causes.
“Determinism implies that good epistemic reasons play no role in explaining why one believes determinism itself because they would believe it regardless of whether it was true or not.”
My friend Connor asks: Couldn’t the determinist say “Having a good epistemic reason to believe something is part of what deterministically causes us to believe it?”
What Lucas had in mind was a physicalistic version of determinism. So your beliefs would be determined by purely physical processes in your brain, not by "epistemic reasons".
Is a “purely physical process” incapable of acting on good epistemic reasons?
I’m not sure what you mean by that. My friend Connor asks: “Epistemic reasons” are abstract objects, aren’t they? What does that have to do with physicalism?
Well, maybe the case. I wasn't thinkin specificly in that way, but seems to be the conclusion. Because finally what "PublicIntelletuals..." is calling "epistemic reasons" is the determining physical process of the brain. In my comment I was only pointing out that it was absurd.
'Couldn’t the determinist say “Having a good epistemic reason to believe something is part of what deterministically causes us to believe it?”'
This is the fundamental point. Determinism really does mean determinism all the way down, and this is a difficult proposition for many to accept I think.
In that case, everything that anyone believes in is believed with good epistemic reasons, because anything that anyone believes is, in fact, believed by deterministic causes.