Here, I explain two leading theories of the structure of knowledge, and why one of them is better.* [* Based on: “Foundations and Coherence” in A Companion to Epistemology, 2nd ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 22-33.] 1. The Regress Problem If someone claims to know, or even justifiedly believe, A, then it seems apt to ask them what
I have a terminological complaint regarding the word 'reason'. You write "some beliefs (known as “foundational”) are justified in a way that doesn’t depend on reasons" and also "if you’re in pain, it seems like you just know that you’re in pain; you don’t need reasons or an argument to figure that out."
I'd prefer to say that foundationalism is the thesis that some beliefs are justified by things that aren't beliefs. I believe I am in pain because I /am/ in pain -- and my belief /depends on/ that pain. The pain is not an optional extra that may or may not be there along with my belief; it is the foundation on which my belief that I am in pain depends.
Similarly, I'd say that the reason I believe that there is a computer in front of me right now is that I (at least seem to) see a computer in front of me now.
In your terminology it would be perfectly appropriate to say things like "You have no reason to believe you're in pain" and "You have no reason to believe there's a computer in front of you." Those strike me as ludicrous things to say.
Note: I do understand that "foundational beliefs" as you define them /may/ have reasons: "[a] foundational belief is defined as one that does not /need/ a reason." What I'm saying is that the belief that I am in pain or that I see a computer in front of me /does/ "need a reason" -- it's just that the reason is not another belief.
Also note that I don't think I've said anything to disprove your arguments above. I just dislike the way you used the term 'reason', and think my way of using it is closer to its colloquial use.
Foundationalism is a post factum tidy explanation. But how we actually come to believe things, and how we come to Foundationalism even is by Coherentism. Or rather a loose coherentism assisted by empirical support from lived experience.
Children don't start by abstract theoritical foundations like A=A (they don't even have things like object permanence or any foundational axioms to make them not believe in all kinds of magic). They just get emerged into beliefs and belief systems that support one another and build up to form their understanding of the world.
If, later, an foundationalist understanging of knowledge comes, it's because those foundations were created, reinforced, and installed via coherentism+empiricism.
So, foundationalism doesn't desribe any ultimate "structure of knowledge". Just an after the fact, tidy theoretical formulation of it.
There’s a difference between ontogenetic explanations (how we get to form beliefs) and epistemic justifications (how we can conclude they are true). You seem to be mixing the two.
Yes, we can distinguish between how we learn and how we justify. But they are so closely related that it is easy to confuse them. Justification ought to serve as a error correction process, but for that to work, we need to consider that we might be making errors, and not use it to try to cover them up.
The obvious bootstrapping argument from science and the philosophy of biology, is that evolutionary fitness has selected perceptively or sensorily useful phenotypic characteristics in complex multi-cellular organisms over hundreds of millions of years. Without those 'foundations' we would not exist. The accompanying evolution of memory and learning has greatly augmented and transformed preception and our stimulus responses to the point where the label empirical now has a clear meaning.
So we do not mentally reconstruct an entire 'possible world' ever time we act or imagine.
Our epistemological foundations are routed in our biology that has been built into us over long evolutionary timescales coupled with the learning acquired by our culture and individually during our lifetimes.
Coherence is fundamental in the sense it that is a measure of the fitness of our mental models of the world.
However let us not confuse fundamental and foundational in our epistemology.
I endorse every argument here except 2.4. Why think that the fact that some concept can't be defined means it can't be meaningfully discussed. In fact, you argue strongly against that here https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_3
Oh I don’t think he’s saying that, Matthew, he’s just saying that: “The weakest notion of coherence is too strong, and the strongest notion is too weak. So there is no good notion of coherence.”
Yes but you said: “Why think that the fact that some concept can’t be defined means it can’t be meaningfully discussed”. I don’t think 2.4 or this blogpost commits Huemer to that more radical view. In fact, as you yourself alluded to with the link to his article, in his book KRV, Huemer also doesn’t attempt to define philosophy and yet goes on to meaningfully discuss it using examples and so on, so I’m not sure why you think this post or 2.4 further commits Huemer to the view that without a definition, meaningful discussion cannot take place.
I have a terminological complaint regarding the word 'reason'. You write "some beliefs (known as “foundational”) are justified in a way that doesn’t depend on reasons" and also "if you’re in pain, it seems like you just know that you’re in pain; you don’t need reasons or an argument to figure that out."
I'd prefer to say that foundationalism is the thesis that some beliefs are justified by things that aren't beliefs. I believe I am in pain because I /am/ in pain -- and my belief /depends on/ that pain. The pain is not an optional extra that may or may not be there along with my belief; it is the foundation on which my belief that I am in pain depends.
Similarly, I'd say that the reason I believe that there is a computer in front of me right now is that I (at least seem to) see a computer in front of me now.
In your terminology it would be perfectly appropriate to say things like "You have no reason to believe you're in pain" and "You have no reason to believe there's a computer in front of you." Those strike me as ludicrous things to say.
Note: I do understand that "foundational beliefs" as you define them /may/ have reasons: "[a] foundational belief is defined as one that does not /need/ a reason." What I'm saying is that the belief that I am in pain or that I see a computer in front of me /does/ "need a reason" -- it's just that the reason is not another belief.
Also note that I don't think I've said anything to disprove your arguments above. I just dislike the way you used the term 'reason', and think my way of using it is closer to its colloquial use.
Foundationalism is a post factum tidy explanation. But how we actually come to believe things, and how we come to Foundationalism even is by Coherentism. Or rather a loose coherentism assisted by empirical support from lived experience.
Children don't start by abstract theoritical foundations like A=A (they don't even have things like object permanence or any foundational axioms to make them not believe in all kinds of magic). They just get emerged into beliefs and belief systems that support one another and build up to form their understanding of the world.
If, later, an foundationalist understanging of knowledge comes, it's because those foundations were created, reinforced, and installed via coherentism+empiricism.
So, foundationalism doesn't desribe any ultimate "structure of knowledge". Just an after the fact, tidy theoretical formulation of it.
There’s a difference between ontogenetic explanations (how we get to form beliefs) and epistemic justifications (how we can conclude they are true). You seem to be mixing the two.
Yes, we can distinguish between how we learn and how we justify. But they are so closely related that it is easy to confuse them. Justification ought to serve as a error correction process, but for that to work, we need to consider that we might be making errors, and not use it to try to cover them up.
Not foundationalism, not coherentism, but a secret third thing: foundherentism ;)
The obvious bootstrapping argument from science and the philosophy of biology, is that evolutionary fitness has selected perceptively or sensorily useful phenotypic characteristics in complex multi-cellular organisms over hundreds of millions of years. Without those 'foundations' we would not exist. The accompanying evolution of memory and learning has greatly augmented and transformed preception and our stimulus responses to the point where the label empirical now has a clear meaning.
So we do not mentally reconstruct an entire 'possible world' ever time we act or imagine.
Our epistemological foundations are routed in our biology that has been built into us over long evolutionary timescales coupled with the learning acquired by our culture and individually during our lifetimes.
Coherence is fundamental in the sense it that is a measure of the fitness of our mental models of the world.
However let us not confuse fundamental and foundational in our epistemology.
I endorse every argument here except 2.4. Why think that the fact that some concept can't be defined means it can't be meaningfully discussed. In fact, you argue strongly against that here https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_3
Oh I don’t think he’s saying that, Matthew, he’s just saying that: “The weakest notion of coherence is too strong, and the strongest notion is too weak. So there is no good notion of coherence.”
That there's no good definition doesn't mean there's no good notion.
Yes but you said: “Why think that the fact that some concept can’t be defined means it can’t be meaningfully discussed”. I don’t think 2.4 or this blogpost commits Huemer to that more radical view. In fact, as you yourself alluded to with the link to his article, in his book KRV, Huemer also doesn’t attempt to define philosophy and yet goes on to meaningfully discuss it using examples and so on, so I’m not sure why you think this post or 2.4 further commits Huemer to the view that without a definition, meaningful discussion cannot take place.
Okay, but then why does the fact that there is no good definition of coherence matter?
It matters insofar as it undermines coherentism as a plausible structure for knowledge.
Why? Why does the fact that it's hard to give a definition matter?