Nov 18, 2023·edited Nov 18, 2023Liked by Michael Huemer
Holy crap, this argument is pure genius. Why haven’t I seen this before? I just shared it with an antirealist friend and he admitted he was completely stumped. It just works. Nice job.
I was stumped in the same way with @Fake Nous' bamboozling logic: it was magic, a sleight of hand that would have had David Copperfield applauding.
The great trick is neatly summed up in
"if John said that Q, that would be a reason to believe Q. ... you have at least some reason to believe that John said that Q. In that case, you in fact have at least some reason to believe Q".
So long as you have a reason, even if it's a fake reason, then you have An Ontological Proof of Moral Realism.
We know that the magician is playing a trick on us, but we delight in it, just as we know the pantomime horse is really two people getting sweaty under a theatrical costume. We suspend disbelief despite the facts, as we do in many other areas of life. One of the most amazing works of "pure genius" is going to the supermarket, putting goods into a basket, and then swiping a piece of plastic unattached to any bank account, and walking out of the shop with the goods but without being arrested.
From the supermarket, I go home, which apparently is "valued" at £1,000,000. This valuation, like the plastic with no money, is more pure genius. Or "crap", whichever your perspective. There must have been some other trickery involved, though, because last year my wife told me it was worth £1.2m. But then again, "if my wife said that it was worth £1.2m, that would be a reason to believe my wife; you have at least some reason to believe that my wife said that it was worth £1.2m. In that case, you in fact have at least some reason to believe my wife".
I think the definition of moral realism you gave is somewhat unsatisfying. When I think about moral realism, the thesis that comes to mind is something like:
Strong moral realism: there are necessary moral facts about what is good and bad, just like there are mathematical facts.
SMR seems better than your definition of MR because SMR is just a fact about reality, while MR is agent-focused, since it is a claim about reasons some moral agent (the reader? every possible moral agent?) has. SMR is also better than MR because it has stronger implications: if your epistemic credence in SMR is 1, your epistemic credence in "torturing babies is bad" should be 1, while any non-negligible credence in "torturing babies is bad" is compatible with MR.
Then, MR can be rephrased as "SMR has a non-negligible epistemic credence", by an argument similar to yours.
What is special about the baby torture case that allows us to know this about it, but not be able to generalize?
“The premises of the anti-torture argument (1-4 in sec. 2) do not depend on self-interest, desire, or the attitudes of observers towards baby-torture. “
The premises don’t mention self-interest, desire, or the attitudes of observers, but would the argument work among aliens that had different psychology?
Why did human psychology evolve to give us these intuitions, if not for reproductive fitness, which might be seen as a form of prudence, or something like it?
well the idea here is that morality has its basis in reason. of course, the relation between reason and the world can vary, you could argue in a Kantian-esque correlationist matter that we cannot know the nature of being itself or if it abides by the logical principles of thought, or you could be a realist and say they do. As far as I'm aware an evolutionary argument would argue more towards a realism regarding our basic logical principles, although I suppose we cannot know for sure. It's worth noting obviously that Kant still believed morality to be 'objective' insofar as it has its basis in human reason, even if human reason is restricted to the phenomenal. To beings of our sort, reason is organized in such a way that moral principles follow from it, and we self-legislate ourselves.
“the idea here is that morality has its basis in reason. “
Is that the idea? As in, we have reasons for all our moral intuitions? Or reason itself entails specific moral principles?
“ an evolutionary argument would argue more towards a realism regarding our basic logical principles, “
As in, logic is real? Or what?
“ To beings of our sort, “
Which sort is that? Beings capable of reason?
“reason is organized in such a way that moral principles follow from it, “
Kant was trying to answer Hume, but if he succeeded, I do not understand his account. If I understand Hume, his point is that if you make an argument that has an “ought” in the conclusion, it needs to have a premise with an “ought” in it. Argument cannot go from purely “is” premises to an “ought” conclusion. So how does reason accomplish that fundamental “ought” without using argument?
"Is that the idea? As in, we have reasons for all our moral intuitions? Or reason itself entails specific moral principles?"
well, if you read the beginning of this article you'd find your answer:
"Moral realism: The thesis that there are some objective moral reasons.
That is, there are some reasons for action that are categorical (not based on the agent’s desires), non-selfish (not based on the agent’s interests), and objective (independent of the attitudes of observers towards the action)."
"As in, logic is real? Or what?"
What does it mean for logic to be real to you? Would the existence of a being with logical principles that don't correlate to how reality is in-itself still count as that logic being real? As a part of reality itself, there exists beings who operate or think the world through it. Or should we exclude ourselves as subjects from being 'real' or part of 'reality' so reality does not include our logical principles?
"Which sort is that? Beings capable of reason?"
Sure, as long as we qualify reason to mean the specific logical principles by which we think through things.
"Kant was trying to answer Hume, but if he succeeded, I do not understand his account. If I understand Hume, his point is that if you make an argument that has an “ought” in the conclusion, it needs to have a premise with an “ought” in it. Argument cannot go from purely “is” premises to an “ought” conclusion. So how does reason accomplish that fundamental “ought” without using argument?"
Hume isn't exactly relevant for the point here, though I would still implore you to read Kant or atleast secondary literature such as those by Henry Allison. The traditional interpretation that Hume is Kant's main enemy in the Critiques is largely viewed as outdated anyways.
In any case, the point is that like the author for Kant moral realism does not mean our feelings about what is right or wrong are the primary means by which we ascertain the moral law or its validity, but that it is the product of our mode of reasoning, its logical principles, itself if followed through. Thus Kant draws a distinction between 'pathological' inclinations, even those such as empathy, and the moral law within, which is has its origins in reason. I haven't read enough about the author to know whether he believes the logical principles of thought applied to create his demonstration have an ontological reality or like Kant they only have an existence as normative standards of our sensibility/understanding, but I think the general point remains the same either way.
"What does that mean?"
It means that for Kant we give ourselves the moral law discussed above.
“Hume isn't exactly relevant for the point here, though I would still implore you to read Kant “
I’ve read him, but do not claim to understand him.
“[…] The traditional interpretation that Hume is Kant's main enemy in the Critiques is largely viewed as outdated anyways. “
If Hume is correct, how can Kant get his result?
“In any case, the point is that like the author for Kant moral realism does not mean our feelings about what is right or wrong are the primary means by which we ascertain the moral law or its validity, but that it is the product of our mode of reasoning”
That seems vague. How do we get from a description of a mode of reasoning to a prescription for action?
“its logical principles, itself if followed through. Thus Kant draws a distinction between 'pathological' inclinations, even those such as empathy, and the moral law within, which is has its origins in reason.”
So there are pathological inclinations and other sorts of inclinations, and among the others are moral inclinations?
What's fascinating is the choice of baby torture: @Michael Huemer chooses it because, of course, nobody apart from moral monsters would ever torture babies, would they?
Babies come into this world crying, or if they don't, then we spank them so that they do cry, which we then celebrate.
Straightaway, we dragoon them into a regime of eating and sleeping to suit the parent. So tired does the parent become that they are only too delighted to pack them off to the childminder or the nanny, or to palm them onto a grandparent.
And then it's off to school, where they are forced to go against their wishes - yes, I'm sure you loved school, but there's a BDSM fetishist in every class. Everyone is punished, the good student with interminable tests and exams, and the bad with detention and, if they're lucky, expulsion.
And finally, when Mummy's little baby is of a certain age, they are turfed out and forced to make their own living.
"When you grow up, what do you want to be?"
'I want to be an honest, brave, compassionate human being.'
"No, I mean, how do you want to sell your labour?"
And yet, torturing babies is Wrong with a capital MR. Or SMR, as @technoscentient would have it!
I have always understood Moral Realism to be the claim that there are objective moral facts, not that there are objective moral reasons. Is there no difference between moral facts and moral reasons? Please help me, I might be confused.
Cool. So the claim, generally construed, is that for any action A, if it's is possible that there is a reason, r, to do A then there is another reason, s, to do A since, as you suggest, one generally (always?) has a reason to do what one might have a reason to do. But doesn't it beg the question to say that s here is a moral reason? If we have independent grounds for thinking that all reasons are prudential, (i.e. if a relevant form of naturalism is true, say), then your argument merely shows that we can derive the existence of a prudential reason from the possibility of a prudential reason. Nothing in the argument settles that the reason you end up with is moral. What am I missing?
Holy crap, this argument is pure genius. Why haven’t I seen this before? I just shared it with an antirealist friend and he admitted he was completely stumped. It just works. Nice job.
I was stumped in the same way with @Fake Nous' bamboozling logic: it was magic, a sleight of hand that would have had David Copperfield applauding.
The great trick is neatly summed up in
"if John said that Q, that would be a reason to believe Q. ... you have at least some reason to believe that John said that Q. In that case, you in fact have at least some reason to believe Q".
So long as you have a reason, even if it's a fake reason, then you have An Ontological Proof of Moral Realism.
We know that the magician is playing a trick on us, but we delight in it, just as we know the pantomime horse is really two people getting sweaty under a theatrical costume. We suspend disbelief despite the facts, as we do in many other areas of life. One of the most amazing works of "pure genius" is going to the supermarket, putting goods into a basket, and then swiping a piece of plastic unattached to any bank account, and walking out of the shop with the goods but without being arrested.
From the supermarket, I go home, which apparently is "valued" at £1,000,000. This valuation, like the plastic with no money, is more pure genius. Or "crap", whichever your perspective. There must have been some other trickery involved, though, because last year my wife told me it was worth £1.2m. But then again, "if my wife said that it was worth £1.2m, that would be a reason to believe my wife; you have at least some reason to believe that my wife said that it was worth £1.2m. In that case, you in fact have at least some reason to believe my wife".
I think the definition of moral realism you gave is somewhat unsatisfying. When I think about moral realism, the thesis that comes to mind is something like:
Strong moral realism: there are necessary moral facts about what is good and bad, just like there are mathematical facts.
SMR seems better than your definition of MR because SMR is just a fact about reality, while MR is agent-focused, since it is a claim about reasons some moral agent (the reader? every possible moral agent?) has. SMR is also better than MR because it has stronger implications: if your epistemic credence in SMR is 1, your epistemic credence in "torturing babies is bad" should be 1, while any non-negligible credence in "torturing babies is bad" is compatible with MR.
Then, MR can be rephrased as "SMR has a non-negligible epistemic credence", by an argument similar to yours.
What is special about the baby torture case that allows us to know this about it, but not be able to generalize?
“The premises of the anti-torture argument (1-4 in sec. 2) do not depend on self-interest, desire, or the attitudes of observers towards baby-torture. “
The premises don’t mention self-interest, desire, or the attitudes of observers, but would the argument work among aliens that had different psychology?
Why did human psychology evolve to give us these intuitions, if not for reproductive fitness, which might be seen as a form of prudence, or something like it?
well the idea here is that morality has its basis in reason. of course, the relation between reason and the world can vary, you could argue in a Kantian-esque correlationist matter that we cannot know the nature of being itself or if it abides by the logical principles of thought, or you could be a realist and say they do. As far as I'm aware an evolutionary argument would argue more towards a realism regarding our basic logical principles, although I suppose we cannot know for sure. It's worth noting obviously that Kant still believed morality to be 'objective' insofar as it has its basis in human reason, even if human reason is restricted to the phenomenal. To beings of our sort, reason is organized in such a way that moral principles follow from it, and we self-legislate ourselves.
“the idea here is that morality has its basis in reason. “
Is that the idea? As in, we have reasons for all our moral intuitions? Or reason itself entails specific moral principles?
“ an evolutionary argument would argue more towards a realism regarding our basic logical principles, “
As in, logic is real? Or what?
“ To beings of our sort, “
Which sort is that? Beings capable of reason?
“reason is organized in such a way that moral principles follow from it, “
Kant was trying to answer Hume, but if he succeeded, I do not understand his account. If I understand Hume, his point is that if you make an argument that has an “ought” in the conclusion, it needs to have a premise with an “ought” in it. Argument cannot go from purely “is” premises to an “ought” conclusion. So how does reason accomplish that fundamental “ought” without using argument?
“and we self-legislate ourselves.”
What does that mean?
"Is that the idea? As in, we have reasons for all our moral intuitions? Or reason itself entails specific moral principles?"
well, if you read the beginning of this article you'd find your answer:
"Moral realism: The thesis that there are some objective moral reasons.
That is, there are some reasons for action that are categorical (not based on the agent’s desires), non-selfish (not based on the agent’s interests), and objective (independent of the attitudes of observers towards the action)."
"As in, logic is real? Or what?"
What does it mean for logic to be real to you? Would the existence of a being with logical principles that don't correlate to how reality is in-itself still count as that logic being real? As a part of reality itself, there exists beings who operate or think the world through it. Or should we exclude ourselves as subjects from being 'real' or part of 'reality' so reality does not include our logical principles?
"Which sort is that? Beings capable of reason?"
Sure, as long as we qualify reason to mean the specific logical principles by which we think through things.
"Kant was trying to answer Hume, but if he succeeded, I do not understand his account. If I understand Hume, his point is that if you make an argument that has an “ought” in the conclusion, it needs to have a premise with an “ought” in it. Argument cannot go from purely “is” premises to an “ought” conclusion. So how does reason accomplish that fundamental “ought” without using argument?"
Hume isn't exactly relevant for the point here, though I would still implore you to read Kant or atleast secondary literature such as those by Henry Allison. The traditional interpretation that Hume is Kant's main enemy in the Critiques is largely viewed as outdated anyways.
In any case, the point is that like the author for Kant moral realism does not mean our feelings about what is right or wrong are the primary means by which we ascertain the moral law or its validity, but that it is the product of our mode of reasoning, its logical principles, itself if followed through. Thus Kant draws a distinction between 'pathological' inclinations, even those such as empathy, and the moral law within, which is has its origins in reason. I haven't read enough about the author to know whether he believes the logical principles of thought applied to create his demonstration have an ontological reality or like Kant they only have an existence as normative standards of our sensibility/understanding, but I think the general point remains the same either way.
"What does that mean?"
It means that for Kant we give ourselves the moral law discussed above.
“Hume isn't exactly relevant for the point here, though I would still implore you to read Kant “
I’ve read him, but do not claim to understand him.
“[…] The traditional interpretation that Hume is Kant's main enemy in the Critiques is largely viewed as outdated anyways. “
If Hume is correct, how can Kant get his result?
“In any case, the point is that like the author for Kant moral realism does not mean our feelings about what is right or wrong are the primary means by which we ascertain the moral law or its validity, but that it is the product of our mode of reasoning”
That seems vague. How do we get from a description of a mode of reasoning to a prescription for action?
“its logical principles, itself if followed through. Thus Kant draws a distinction between 'pathological' inclinations, even those such as empathy, and the moral law within, which is has its origins in reason.”
So there are pathological inclinations and other sorts of inclinations, and among the others are moral inclinations?
What's fascinating is the choice of baby torture: @Michael Huemer chooses it because, of course, nobody apart from moral monsters would ever torture babies, would they?
Babies come into this world crying, or if they don't, then we spank them so that they do cry, which we then celebrate.
Straightaway, we dragoon them into a regime of eating and sleeping to suit the parent. So tired does the parent become that they are only too delighted to pack them off to the childminder or the nanny, or to palm them onto a grandparent.
And then it's off to school, where they are forced to go against their wishes - yes, I'm sure you loved school, but there's a BDSM fetishist in every class. Everyone is punished, the good student with interminable tests and exams, and the bad with detention and, if they're lucky, expulsion.
And finally, when Mummy's little baby is of a certain age, they are turfed out and forced to make their own living.
"When you grow up, what do you want to be?"
'I want to be an honest, brave, compassionate human being.'
"No, I mean, how do you want to sell your labour?"
And yet, torturing babies is Wrong with a capital MR. Or SMR, as @technoscentient would have it!
I have always understood Moral Realism to be the claim that there are objective moral facts, not that there are objective moral reasons. Is there no difference between moral facts and moral reasons? Please help me, I might be confused.
Cool. So the claim, generally construed, is that for any action A, if it's is possible that there is a reason, r, to do A then there is another reason, s, to do A since, as you suggest, one generally (always?) has a reason to do what one might have a reason to do. But doesn't it beg the question to say that s here is a moral reason? If we have independent grounds for thinking that all reasons are prudential, (i.e. if a relevant form of naturalism is true, say), then your argument merely shows that we can derive the existence of a prudential reason from the possibility of a prudential reason. Nothing in the argument settles that the reason you end up with is moral. What am I missing?
It's his attempt at bridging the gap between Is and Ought.