David Friedman recently said, “There may be two libertarians who agree on everything, but I'm not one of them.” That indicates he's an independent thinker. As Lyndon Johnson said, “If two men agree on everything, you may be sure that one of them is doing the thinking.” I suspect independent thinking is more common among libertarians than among progressives and conservatives for at least three reasons: (1) Libertarianism is internally consistent because it can be derived from mutually consistent basic principles, but progressivism and conservatism are logically inconsistent and hence must be learned from others. (2) At least four studies have found libertarians to be, on average, more rational than progressives and conservatives. (3) Unlike libertarianism, explicit progressive and conservative ideologies are sufficiently common that they're easy to accept uncritically from family, friends, and acquaintances.
In 1972, by a process of reasoning, I discovered a political philosophy I learned in 1976 is called “libertarianism” after I scored 100% libertarian on a 20-item “Find Your Political Position” test. I later learned that several other people discovered libertarianism independently. More recently, I scored 160 (the highest possible score) on Bryan Caplan's Libertarian Purity Test. Despite that evidence, I think the probability that I'm 100% libertarian is close to zero. That's because there are an indefinitely large number of political issues and it seems to be humanly impossible to always avoid every possible logical or factual error.
Dr. Huemer, concerning the issues you discuss, I have more in common with you than with anyone else I know. But we still disagree on several issues on which we can't both be right. Perhaps you're right on the vast majority, but I find it hard to believe I'm wrong on every one.
I'll mention just one issue from today's post. You said that on the theories of Rand, Rothbard, and Nozick, “you wouldn't be justified in stealing a loaf of bread even to save a starving person's life” a position with which you disagree. I don't know why those thinkers would take that position, but I agree with it for my own reason. I'll disregard the possibility that the victim of theft might starve because the bread was stolen. You may regard my reason as a quibble, but I think it's important to be clear about the meanings of one's terms. I believe that most people, whether they're libertarians or not, will agree that stealing is an injustice. In libertarian theory, the owner of the bread has a property right to the bread. Does the owner of the bread lose this right to a starving person? If so, given the large number of starving people in the world, who else has the right to the bread? If starving person A can rightfully steal the bread from its original owner, can starving person B rightfully steal it from A, and so on indefinitely? Who finally gets to own and consume the bread? Again, a violation of a right is widely regarded as an injustice, and “justified” is often taken to mean “shown to be just.” One can't avoid contradiction while asserting that an unjust act can be shown to be just. Instead of saying that stealing can be justified, I'd advise saying that, under certain circumstances, it can be excused or defended. It's easy to think of scenarios in which an unjust act is defensible because it's necessary to avoid a great natural evil, such as a killer asteroid strike, which would itself not be unjust. That just shows that justice is not the highest possible value. Life appears to be that value because, in the absence of life, nothing could have rights, so nothing could be just or unjust or, for that matter, good or evil.
Huemer is an ethical intuitionist but not a hard deontologist.
" Strong deontology is a form of deontological ethics that holds moral rules and duties as absolute and exceptionless. In this view, actions are always right or wrong, regardless of their consequences. This contrasts with weak deontology, which allows for some flexibility or exceptions under extreme circumstances.
A strong deontologist, like Immanuel Kant, would argue that certain moral duties (e.g., not lying, not killing) must be followed at all times, even if breaking them would lead to better outcomes. For example, under strong deontology, lying to save a life would still be morally wrong because lying is inherently impermissible."
In the case of the starving person it seems obvious that is justified for him to steal the bread. There are strong arguments against your view.
We seem to be engaged in a verbal dispute—i.e., a disagreement about the use of words, typically due to ambiguity, instead of about relevant facts. I'm not a strong (or hard) deontologist like Kant, who said “Let justice prevail though the heavens fall,” and neither is Dave's Not Here. That should be evident from the fact that I said, “It's easy to think of scenarios in which an unjust act is defensible because it's necessary to avoid a great natural evil...which would itself not be unjust” (because natural disasters aren't caused by moral agents) and he said, “A rational person will violate rights when the stakes are obvious enough and high enough.”
I merely object to the use of “justified,” which can be construed as meaning “shown to be just,” in contexts that suggest that an unjust act can be shown to be just instead of, say, “defensible”. Dave's Not Here objects to “permissible” for the reasons he gave above.
I also find this issue confused. Philosophers often talk about whether it is permissible to do something, and presumably if it is permissible it can’t really be a violation of rights. A rational person will violate rights when the stakes are obvious enough and high enough. The question is not whether this is “permissible” (who is permitting it?), but whether the violator is willing to make compensation for the act.
That's a good point about permissibility. On the issue of compensation for a rights violation, my position is this: The rights violator is obligated to compensate his victim or his victim's heirs or assignees (assuming the violator is not such a person) only to the extent possible. That “ought implies can” (if one ought to do x, then one can do x), and that “ought” in that context implies obligation, are widely accepted by moral philosophers. Assuming they're right, if it's impossible for a rights violator to ever provide adequate compensation, then he ought not to do so (or is not obligated to do so). That seems reasonable because it's hard to see why one must do what one cannot do, or why it's necessary to do the impossible.
Looking at #3 'Skepticism of Authority: The same moral standards that apply to private agents apply to governments; governments have no special entitlement to coerce.'
I often wonder how writings such as Plato's 'The Republic' have done so much for Western sensibilities yet fail to translate regarding governments.
For example, through Socrates, Plato speaks of the philosopher setting up 'the city' in themselves and seeing if it can be outworked in an actual governed city (end of book IX). Plato starts with the basis that what applies to private agents can and must apply to governments. Was Plato a libertarian?
David Friedman recently said, “There may be two libertarians who agree on everything, but I'm not one of them.” That indicates he's an independent thinker. As Lyndon Johnson said, “If two men agree on everything, you may be sure that one of them is doing the thinking.” I suspect independent thinking is more common among libertarians than among progressives and conservatives for at least three reasons: (1) Libertarianism is internally consistent because it can be derived from mutually consistent basic principles, but progressivism and conservatism are logically inconsistent and hence must be learned from others. (2) At least four studies have found libertarians to be, on average, more rational than progressives and conservatives. (3) Unlike libertarianism, explicit progressive and conservative ideologies are sufficiently common that they're easy to accept uncritically from family, friends, and acquaintances.
In 1972, by a process of reasoning, I discovered a political philosophy I learned in 1976 is called “libertarianism” after I scored 100% libertarian on a 20-item “Find Your Political Position” test. I later learned that several other people discovered libertarianism independently. More recently, I scored 160 (the highest possible score) on Bryan Caplan's Libertarian Purity Test. Despite that evidence, I think the probability that I'm 100% libertarian is close to zero. That's because there are an indefinitely large number of political issues and it seems to be humanly impossible to always avoid every possible logical or factual error.
Dr. Huemer, concerning the issues you discuss, I have more in common with you than with anyone else I know. But we still disagree on several issues on which we can't both be right. Perhaps you're right on the vast majority, but I find it hard to believe I'm wrong on every one.
I'll mention just one issue from today's post. You said that on the theories of Rand, Rothbard, and Nozick, “you wouldn't be justified in stealing a loaf of bread even to save a starving person's life” a position with which you disagree. I don't know why those thinkers would take that position, but I agree with it for my own reason. I'll disregard the possibility that the victim of theft might starve because the bread was stolen. You may regard my reason as a quibble, but I think it's important to be clear about the meanings of one's terms. I believe that most people, whether they're libertarians or not, will agree that stealing is an injustice. In libertarian theory, the owner of the bread has a property right to the bread. Does the owner of the bread lose this right to a starving person? If so, given the large number of starving people in the world, who else has the right to the bread? If starving person A can rightfully steal the bread from its original owner, can starving person B rightfully steal it from A, and so on indefinitely? Who finally gets to own and consume the bread? Again, a violation of a right is widely regarded as an injustice, and “justified” is often taken to mean “shown to be just.” One can't avoid contradiction while asserting that an unjust act can be shown to be just. Instead of saying that stealing can be justified, I'd advise saying that, under certain circumstances, it can be excused or defended. It's easy to think of scenarios in which an unjust act is defensible because it's necessary to avoid a great natural evil, such as a killer asteroid strike, which would itself not be unjust. That just shows that justice is not the highest possible value. Life appears to be that value because, in the absence of life, nothing could have rights, so nothing could be just or unjust or, for that matter, good or evil.
Huemer is an ethical intuitionist but not a hard deontologist.
" Strong deontology is a form of deontological ethics that holds moral rules and duties as absolute and exceptionless. In this view, actions are always right or wrong, regardless of their consequences. This contrasts with weak deontology, which allows for some flexibility or exceptions under extreme circumstances.
A strong deontologist, like Immanuel Kant, would argue that certain moral duties (e.g., not lying, not killing) must be followed at all times, even if breaking them would lead to better outcomes. For example, under strong deontology, lying to save a life would still be morally wrong because lying is inherently impermissible."
In the case of the starving person it seems obvious that is justified for him to steal the bread. There are strong arguments against your view.
We seem to be engaged in a verbal dispute—i.e., a disagreement about the use of words, typically due to ambiguity, instead of about relevant facts. I'm not a strong (or hard) deontologist like Kant, who said “Let justice prevail though the heavens fall,” and neither is Dave's Not Here. That should be evident from the fact that I said, “It's easy to think of scenarios in which an unjust act is defensible because it's necessary to avoid a great natural evil...which would itself not be unjust” (because natural disasters aren't caused by moral agents) and he said, “A rational person will violate rights when the stakes are obvious enough and high enough.”
I merely object to the use of “justified,” which can be construed as meaning “shown to be just,” in contexts that suggest that an unjust act can be shown to be just instead of, say, “defensible”. Dave's Not Here objects to “permissible” for the reasons he gave above.
I also find this issue confused. Philosophers often talk about whether it is permissible to do something, and presumably if it is permissible it can’t really be a violation of rights. A rational person will violate rights when the stakes are obvious enough and high enough. The question is not whether this is “permissible” (who is permitting it?), but whether the violator is willing to make compensation for the act.
That's a good point about permissibility. On the issue of compensation for a rights violation, my position is this: The rights violator is obligated to compensate his victim or his victim's heirs or assignees (assuming the violator is not such a person) only to the extent possible. That “ought implies can” (if one ought to do x, then one can do x), and that “ought” in that context implies obligation, are widely accepted by moral philosophers. Assuming they're right, if it's impossible for a rights violator to ever provide adequate compensation, then he ought not to do so (or is not obligated to do so). That seems reasonable because it's hard to see why one must do what one cannot do, or why it's necessary to do the impossible.
Was Plato a libertarian? (hear me out...)
Looking at #3 'Skepticism of Authority: The same moral standards that apply to private agents apply to governments; governments have no special entitlement to coerce.'
I often wonder how writings such as Plato's 'The Republic' have done so much for Western sensibilities yet fail to translate regarding governments.
For example, through Socrates, Plato speaks of the philosopher setting up 'the city' in themselves and seeing if it can be outworked in an actual governed city (end of book IX). Plato starts with the basis that what applies to private agents can and must apply to governments. Was Plato a libertarian?
One of my all-time favorite books!