Here, I defend the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism against an objection.* [ *Based on: “Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Mizrahi,” Logos and Episteme 5 (2014): 223-9. ] 1. The Self-Defeat Argument for PC Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) holds that you are (to some degree) justified in believing whatever seems to you to be the case, as long as you have no grounds for doubt. The Self-defeat argument for PC says something like this:
Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments
Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments
Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments
Here, I defend the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism against an objection.* [ *Based on: “Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Mizrahi,” Logos and Episteme 5 (2014): 223-9. ] 1. The Self-Defeat Argument for PC Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) holds that you are (to some degree) justified in believing whatever seems to you to be the case, as long as you have no grounds for doubt. The Self-defeat argument for PC says something like this: