The Problem of Political Authority
https://www.amazon.com/dp/1137281650/
Blurb
A foundational assumption of political philosophy is that some governments possess a moral property known as political authority. Theories of authority are meant to explain, first, why individuals are ethically obligated to obey the law under normal circumstances, and second, why agents of the state are normally ethically entitled to coerce individuals to obey. In the first part of the book, I consider several philosophical accounts that have been offered for why some states possess this peculiar moral status. I argue that none of these accounts succeed, and thus that no person or group genuinely possesses political authority. I go on to consider the psychology of authority, arguing that a series of non-rational factors explain traditional beliefs and attitudes about authority. Finally, I consider the implications for individual and governmental behavior of relinquishing the belief in authority. In the second part of the book, I confront a central assumption of most theories of authority: that a central authority structure is essential to any livable society. Against this assumption, I argue that a livable society could exist with no recognized central authority.
Contents
Part I The Illusion of Authority
1 The Problem of Political Authority
2 The Traditional Social Contract Theory
3 The Hypothetical Social Contract Theory
4 The Authority of Democracy
5 Consequentialism and Fairness
6 The Psychology of Authority
7 What If There Is No Authority?
Part II Society without Authority
8 Evaluating Social Theories
9 The Logic of Predation
10 Individual Security in a Stateless Society
11 Criminal Justice and Dispute Resolution
12 War and Societal Defense
13 From Democracy to Anarchy
Analytical Contents
1 The Problem of Political Authority
1.1 A Political Parable
A private party who performed acts analogous to those of the state would be strongly condemned. The state is not condemned because it is thought to possess ‘authority’.
1.2 The Concept of Authority: A First Pass
Political authority involves both political obligation and political legitimacy.
1.3 Actions versus Agents: The Need for Authority
The difference between our attitudes toward the government and our attitudes toward vigilantes is not due to a difference in their actions, but to a perceived difference in the agents.
1.4 The Significance of Coercion and the Reach of Authority
An account of authority is needed due to the ethical import of coercion. Many government policies depend on belief in authority.
1.5 The Concept of Authority: A Second Pass
The usual conception of authority includes five conditions: generality, particularity, content-independence, comprehensiveness, and supremacy.
1.6 A Comment on Methodology
The best approach to political philosophy involves reasoning from common sense moral judgments.
1.7 Plan of the Book
Part I explains why the state lacks authority. Part II explains how a society can function without authority. Readers should not dismiss the book merely because of its radical thesis.
2 The Traditional Social Contract Theory
2.1 The Social Contract Orthodoxy
The social contract theory hypothesizes a contract requiring citizens to obey the state and the state to protect the citizens.
2.2 The Explicit Social Contract Theory
It is not plausible that such a contract was ever explicitly accepted.
2.3 The Implicit Social Contract Theory
Some argue that we accept the social contract implicitly, through our actions.
2.4 Conditions for Valid Agreements
Valid contracts satisfy four principles: (1) valid consent requires a reasonable way of opting out; (2) explicit dissent trumps alleged implicit consent; (3) an action can be taken as communicating agreement only if the agent believed that if he did not take the action, the agreement would not have been imposed on him; (4) contractual obligation is mutual and conditional.
2.5 Is the Social Contract Valid?
2.5.1 The Difficulty of Opting Out
There is no way of opting out of the social contract without giving up things one has a right to.
2.5.2 The Failure to Recognize Explicit Dissent
The state does not recognize explicit rejections of the social contract.
2.5.3 Unconditional Imposition
The alleged social contract is imposed on citizens almost regardless of what they do.
2.5.4 The Absence of Mutual Obligation
The state officially renounces any obligations toward individuals.
2.6 Conclusion
The traditional social contract theory fails.
3 The Hypothetical Social Contract Theory
3.1 Arguments from Hypothetical Consent
Some philosophers seek to base political authority on the claim that citizens would consent to a social contract in some hypothetical scenario.
3.2 Hypothetical Consent in Ordinary Ethics
Hypothetical consent is valid only when actual consent is unavailable, and the hypothetical consent is consistent with the parties’ actual philosophical beliefs and values.
3.3 Hypothetical Consent and Reasonableness
3.3.1 Hypothetical Agreement as Evidence of
Reasonableness
Some argue that hypothetical consent shows that a political arrangement is reasonable.
3.3.2 Could Agreement Be Reached?
There is no reason to think that all reasonable persons could agree on a social contract.
3.3.3 The Validity of Hypothetical Consent
The reasonableness of a contract does not make it obligatory for parties to accept it, nor render it permissible to force parties to do so.
3.4 Hypothetical Consent and Ethical Constraints
3.4.1 Rawls’ Contract Theory as an Account of Authority
John Rawls, the most influential political philosopher, advances a hypothetical social contract theory.
3.4.2 Could Agreement Be Reached?
There is no reason to think agreement could be reached in Rawls’ hypothetical scenario.
3.4.3 The Validity of Hypothetical Consent, Part 1:
The Appeal to Fair Outcomes
The fairness of a contract does not make it obligatory for parties to accept it, nor make it permissible to force parties to do so.
3.4.4 The Validity of Hypothetical Consent, Part 2:
Sufficient Conditions for Reliable Moral Reasoning
Rawls’ scenario embodies some necessary conditions, but not sufficient conditions, for reliable moral reasoning. Sufficient conditions would require complete and correct values.
3.4.5 The Validity of Hypothetical Consent, Part 3:
Necessary Conditions for Reliable Moral Reasoning
Rawls cannot show that no competing theory satisfies his necessary conditions for acceptable moral reasoning.
3.5 Conclusion
Hypothetical consent cannot save the social contract theory.
4 The Authority of Democracy
4.1 Naive Majoritarianism
In common sense morality, majority will does not generate obligations to comply or entitlements to coerce.
4.2 Deliberative Democracy and Legitimacy
4.2.1 The Idea of Deliberative Democracy
Joshua Cohen articulates conditions for ideal deliberation in a democratic society.
4.2.2 Deliberative Democracy as Fantasy
No actual society satisfies any of Cohen’s conditions.
4.2.3 The Irrelevance of Deliberation
Even if Cohen’s conditions were satisfied, they could not ground authority. No deliberative process suffices to erase individuals’ rights against coercion.
4.3 Equality and Authority
4.3.1 The Argument from Equality
Thomas Christiano derives political obligation from an obligation of justice to support equality and respect others’ judgment.
4.3.2 An Absurdly Demanding Theory of Justice?
Christiano’s conception of justice must be either absurdly demanding or too weak to generate political obligations.
4.3.3 Supporting Democracy through Obedience
Obedience to the law is not a meaningful way of supporting democracy.
4.3.4 Is Democratic Equality Uniquely Public?
The democratic interpretation of the value of equality is not uniquely publicly realizable. Either many interpretations of equality can be publicly realized, or none can.
4.3.5 Respecting Others’ Judgments
There is no duty to respect others’ judgment if you know that their judgment is in fact defective.
4.3.6 Coercion and Treating Others as Inferiors
The state treats citizens as inferiors by forcing citizens to obey its will.
4.3.7 From Obligation to Legitimacy?
The obligations to support equality and to respect others’ judgments are not the sort of obligations that it is appropriate to enforce coercively.
4.4 Conclusion
The democratic process does not confer authority on its outcomes.
5 Consequentialism and Fairness
5.1 Consequentialist Arguments for Political Obligation
5.1.1 The Structure of Consequentialist Arguments for
Political Obligation
Some argue that we have a duty to promote certain large goods that can only be promoted through obedience to the state.
5.1.2 The Benefits of Government
Government protects us from criminals and foreign governments and provides consistent rules for social coordination.
5.1.3 The Duty to Do Good
When one can prevent something very bad with minimal cost, one ought to do so.
5.1.4 The Problem of Individual Redundancy
An individual’s obedience has no impact on the state’s ability to provide key social benefits.
5.2 Rule Consequentialism
It is not wrong to do something merely because it would be bad if everyone did it.
5.3 Fairness
5.3.1 The Fairness Theory of Political Obligation
Some argue that one must obey the law because disobedience is unfair to other citizens.
5.3.2 Obedience as the Cost of Political Goods
For many laws, obedience has no connection with the state’s ability to provide the crucial benefits that are supposed to justify its existence.
5.3.3 Political Obligation for Dissenters
Those who disagree with a policy do not act unfairly in refusing to cooperate with it.
5.3.4 Particularity and the Question of Alternative Goods
There is no need to obey the law if one can do something more socially beneficial instead.
5.4 The Problem of Legitimacy
5.4.1 A Consequentialist Account of Legitimacy
Some argue that the state may coerce individuals because doing so is necessary to achieve great goods.
5.4.2 Comprehensiveness and Content-Independence
Consequentialist arguments can only justify imposition of a narrow range of correct policies.
5.4.3 Supremacy
Consequentialist arguments cannot explain why non-state actors should not be entitled to do the same things as the state, nor why they may not use coercion against the state.
5.5 Conclusion
Consequentialist and fairness-based arguments do not establish political authority.
6 The Psychology of Authority
6.1 The Relevance of Psychology
6.1.1 Is This Book Dangerous?
Some believe that it is dangerous to undermine belief in authority.
6.1.2 The Appeal to Popular Opinion
Some believe that the rejection of authority is too far from common sense political beliefs to be taken seriously.
6.2 The Milgram Experiments
6.2.1 Setup
Milgram devised an experiment in which subjects would be ordered to administer electric shocks to helpless others.
6.2.2 Predictions
Most people expect that subjects will defy the orders of the experimenter.
6.2.3 Results
Two thirds of subjects obey fully, even to the point of administering apparently lethal shocks.
6.2.4 The Dangers of Obedience
The experiment shows that belief in authority is very dangerous.
6.2.5 The Unreliability of Opinions about Authority
The experiment also shows that people have a strong pro-authority bias.
6.3 Cognitive Dissonance
People may seek to rationalize their own obedience to the state by devising theories of authority.
6.4 Social Proof and Status Quo Bias
People are biased toward commonly held beliefs and the practices of their own society.
6.5 The Power of Political Aesthetics
6.5.1 Symbols
The state employs symbols to create an emotional and aesthetic sense of its own power and authority.
6.5.2 Rituals
Rituals serve a similar function.
6.5.3 Authoritative Language
Legal language and the language of some political philosophers serves to encourage feelings of respect for authority.
6.6 Stockholm Syndrome and the Charisma of Power
6.6.1 The Phenomenon of Stockholm Syndrome
Kidnapping victims sometimes emotionally bond with their captors, as in the case of the Stockholm bank robbery.
6.6.2 Why Does Stockholm Syndrome Occur?
The syndrome may be a defensive mechanism.
6.6.3 When Does Stockholm Syndrome Occur?
The syndrome is most likely to develop when one is under the power of another who poses a serious threat, one cannot escape or overpower one’s captor, the captor shows some signs of mercy, and one is isolated from the outside world.
6.6.4 Are Ordinary Citizens Prone to Stockholm
Syndrome?
Subjects of a government satisfy the conditions for the development of Stockholm Syndrome and also show some of its symptoms.
6.7 Case Studies in the Abuse of Power
6.7.1 My Lai Revisited
In the My Lai massacre, soldiers were just following orders. One soldier who helped the villagers was reviled as a traitor.
6.7.2 The Stanford Prison Experiment
Volunteers participated in a simulation of prison life. The guards became increasingly abusive toward the prisoners.
6.7.3 Lessons of the SPE
Power leads people to inflict pain and humiliation on others. Those who are not corrupted do little to restrain those who are.
6.8 Conclusion: Anatomy of an Illusion
The common belief in authority is the product of non-rational biases. Belief in authority is socially harmful.
7 What If There Is No Authority?
7.1 Some Policy Implications
7.1.1 Prostitution and Legal Moralism
If there is no authority, legal moralism, as in the case of laws against prostitution, is unjustified.
7.1.2 Drugs and Paternalism
Legal paternalism, as in the case of drug laws, is unjustified.
7.1.3 Rent-Seeking
Laws motivated by rent-seeking are obviously unjustified.
7.1.4 Immigration
Immigration restrictions are unjustified.
7.1.5 The Protection of Individual Rights
Laws that protect individual rights are justified.
7.1.6 Taxation and Government Finance
Taxation is justified if and only if voluntary methods of government finance prove unworkable.
7.2 The Case of Aid to the Poor
7.2.1 Welfare and Drowning Children
It is sometimes permissible to force someone to help a third party in an emergency. This principle might be used to justify government social welfare programs.
7.2.2 The Utility of Anti-Poverty Programs
It is debatable whether government anti-poverty programs are overall beneficial.
7.2.3 Are Poverty Programs Properly Targeted?
Government anti-poverty programs ignore the interests of extremely needy people in other countries to focus on slightly needy people in one’s own country.
7.2.4 A Clash of Analogies: Drowning Children and
Charity Muggings
Government social programs are more similar to a practice of mugging people to collect money for charity than to a case of forcing a stranger to save a drowning child.
7.2.5 In Case the Foregoing Is Wrong
Even if the foregoing arguments are wrong, the case of aid to the poor does not support political authority, since the state would still have no greater rights than a private citizen.
7.3 Implications for Agents of the State
Government employees should refuse to implement unjust laws.
7.4 Implications for Private Citizens
7.4.1 In Praise of Disobedients
Civil disobedience is justified in response to unjust laws.
7.4.2 On Accepting Punishment
Disobedients should evade punishment when possible.
7.4.3 On Violent Resistance
Violent resistance is usually unjustified, since it typically harms innocent people without achieving its aims.
7.4.4 In Defense of Jury Nullification
It is morally wrong for a jury to convict a defendant under an unjust law.
7.5 Objections in Support of Rule-Worship
7.5.1 May Everyone Do Whatever They Want?
The rejection of authority does not entail that individuals may do whatever they wish or whatever they believe correct.
7.5.2 Procedure versus Substance
No purely procedural criterion for obedience to the law is needed. Assessing the appropriateness of disobedience requires recourse to substantive moral principles.
7.5.3 Undermining Social Order?
Rather than leading to a collapse of social order, a widespread skepticism of authority would most likely lead to a much freer and more just society.
7.5.4 The Consequences of the Doctrine of Content-
Independence
No large institution can be expected to avoid all moral errors. But such errors will be more frequent if we hold the view that the institution is entitled to make the occasional error.
7.6 A Modest Libertarian Foundation
We have derived libertarian conclusions from common sense morality, rather than from any controversial theoretical assumptions.
8 Evaluating Social Theories
8.1 General Observations on the Rational Evaluation of Social Theories
8.1.1 Rational Evaluation Is Comparative
One should not ask whether a social system is good absolutely, but whether it is better than the alternatives.
8.1.2 Rational Evaluation Is Comprehensive
One should consider a system’s overall benefits, rather than focusing on any single issue.
8.1.3 Varieties of Government and Anarchy
We should compare the best form of government to the best form of anarchy.
8.1.4 Against Status Quo Bias
We should avoid the bias in favor of our social status quo.
8.2 A Simplified Conception of Human Nature
8.2.1 Humans Are Approximately Rational
People usually do what makes sense given their goals and beliefs.
8.2.2 Humans Are Aware of their Environment
People usually know obvious, practically relevant facts about how the world works.
8.2.3 Humans Are Selfish but Not Sociopathic
People are largely selfish but accept some moral constraints and have some concern for friends, family, and neighbors.
8.2.4 On Behalf of Simplification
It is useful to consider a simplified account of human nature that identifies some large factors in human motivation.
8.2.5 A Historical Application
The view of human nature just described explains such events as the failure of America’s first experiment with communism.
8.3 Utopianism and Realism
8.3.1 The Principle of Realism
Some social systems, while theoretically desirable, are too utopian to be of interest.
8.3.2 Prescription for a Realistic Anarchism
To be sufficiently realistic, anarchists must argue that their system could succeed with human nature as we know it to be, that their system would be stable, and that it could succeed in a limited area, assuming most people accepted anarchism. They need not argue that people are likely to accept the theory.
8.3.3 Against Utopian Statism
Moderate political theories can be utopian. Statists must not merely assume that governments will act as they should, nor that government officials are exempt from human nature.
9 The Logic of Predation
9.1 The Hobbesian Argument for Government
Hobbes argued that anarchy would be a state of war of all against all, but that a single absolute ruler would create peace.
9.2 Predation in the State of Nature
9.2.1 Game Theoretic Considerations
It is normally prudentially irrational to start fights with others, even in the absence of government.
9.2.2 Social Conditions Affecting the Prevalence of
Violence
The prevalence of violence is affected by cultural values, prosperity, and technology.
9.2.3 Interstate Violence
Interstate violence is not deterred as easily as interpersonal violence.
9.3 Predation in a Totalitarian State
Absolute rulers have little cause to care about their subjects’ rights or welfare and often commit horrible abuses.
9.4 Predation under Democracy
9.4.1 The Tyranny of the Majority
In a democracy, the majority may oppress the minority.
9.4.2 The Fate of Non-Voters
The government may ignore the rights and interests of non-voters, including foreigners affected by the government’s policies.
9.4.3 Voter Ignorance and Irrationality
Voters tend to be politically ignorant and irrational, since each voter knows his own vote will have no impact.
9.4.4 Activism: A Utopian Solution
Citizen activists cannot realistically be expected to keep watch over the thousands of everyday government activities.
9.4.5 The News Media: The Sleeping Watchdog
It is not in the interests of the news media to keep close watch over the government.
9.4.6 The Miracle of Aggregation
Popular biases are likely to swamp the small influence of the few informed and rational voters in a typical election.
9.4.7 The Rewards of Failure
It is not in the government’s interests to solve social problems, since governments get more money and power when social problems get worse.
9.4.8 Constitutional Limits
The government cannot be trusted to enforce the constitution against itself.
9.4.9 Of Checks, Balances, and the Separation of Powers
Different branches of government have no incentive to restrain each other.
9.5 Conclusion
Constitutional democracy with separation of powers is much better than totalitarianism, but it does not eliminate political predation.
10 Individual Security in a Stateless Society
10.1 A Non-State System of Justice
10.1.1 Protection Agencies
In an ungoverned society, competing security agencies would provide protection from crime.
10.1.2 Arbitration Firms
Disputes would be resolved through competing arbitration firms.
10.2 Is it Anarchy?
This system differs from traditional government in that it relies on voluntary relationships and meaningful competition among security providers.
10.3 Conflict between Protectors
10.3.1 The Costs of Violence
Since violence is extremely costly, security agencies would seek peaceful means of resolving disputes.
10.3.2 Opposition to Murder
Most people are strongly opposed both to committing murder and to being shot at. Warlike security agencies would therefore have difficulty retaining employees.
10.3.3 Conflict between Governments
The problem of interstate war is far greater than the potential problem of inter-agency war, because governments face much weaker obstacles to declaring unjust wars.
10.4 Protection for Criminals
10.4.1 The Profitability of Enforcing Rights
Protection of ordinary people is more profitable than protection of criminals.
10.4.2 Criminal Protection by Governments
In contrast, there is little to stop a government from protecting criminals rather than their victims.
10.5 Justice for Sale
10.5.1 Preexisting Entitlement
In one sense, individuals should not have to pay to have their rights protected. But those who provide protection cannot justly be asked to do so for free, and will not do so for free.
10.5.2 Basing Law on Justice
Laws should be based on justice, rather than profitability. Anarchists are no less capable of embracing this norm than supporters of a governmental society.
10.5.3 Buying Justice from Government
Governmental systems also require individuals to pay to have their rights protected and also may base laws on things other than justice.
10.6 Security for the Poor
10.6.1 Do Businesses Serve the Poor?
Most industries are dominated by production for low- and middle-income customers. Protection agencies will provide services for low- and middle-income customers.
10.6.2 How Well Does Government Protect the Poor?
Government does little to protect the poor.
10.7 The Quality of Protection
Private protection agencies would provide higher quality, cheaper services than government police forces, for the same reasons that private provision of most other goods is cheaper and of higher quality.
10.8 Organized Crime
Criminal organizations would be financially crippled by the legalization of such goods and services as gambling, prostitution, and drugs.
10.9 Protection or Extortion?
10.9.1 The Discipline of Competition
Competition prevents protection agencies from becoming abusive.
10.9.2 Extortion by Government
Governments face very little competitive pressure and can therefore get away with far more abusive behavior than a private protection agency.
10.10 Monopolization
10.10.1 The Size Advantage in Combat
Nozick argues that the protection industry would be monopolized due to customers’ desire to be protected by the most powerful agency. This wrongly assumes that the job of protection agencies is combat with other agencies.
10.10.2 Determining Efficient Size of Firms
In the protection industry, the most efficient size for a firm would be quite small. This would enable many firms to coexist.
10.10.3 Government Monopoly
Those who oppose monopolies should oppose the largest of all monopolies, that of government.
10.11 Collusion and Cartelization
10.11.1 The Traditional Problem for Cartels
Individual members of a cartel have an incentive to defect against the cartel.
10.11.2 Cartelization by Threat of Force
It is unlikely that a protection industry cartel would be enforced through violence between protection agencies.
10.11.3 Cartelization through Denial of Extended
Protection
Nor could an industry cartel be enforced through a threat to refuse to protect customers of non-cartel agencies.
10.12 HOA versus Government
HOAs are superior to (traditional) governments because HOA membership is voluntary and there is meaningful competition among HOAs.
10.13 Conclusion
Privatization of the protection industry would result in higher quality with lower costs and fewer undesired side effects than the governmental system.
11 Criminal Justice and Dispute Resolution
11.1 The Integrity of Arbitrators
Arbitration firms would depend on a reputation for fairness and wisdom to attract customers.
11.2 Corporate Manipulation
Businesses do not gain greater profits by making unreasonable demands in regard to dispute resolution mechanisms or anything else.
11.3 Refusing Arbitration
Protection agencies would refuse to protect clients who reject arbitration.
11.4 Why Obey Arbitrators?
Agencies would refuse to protect clients who violate arbitration judgments.
11.5 The Source of Law
Law is best made through contracts and by judges rather than by a legislature.
11.6 Punishment and Restitution
The anarchist justice system would focus on restitution rather than punishment.
11.7 Uncompensable Crimes
Judges would have to decide what to do in cases of crimes for which compensation is impossible.
11.8 Excess Restitution
Criminals might face somewhat higher compensation demands than were truly just. This would not bring down the system and would not be obviously worse than the overpunishment problem in existing governmental systems.
11.9 The Quality of Law and Justice under a Central Authority
11.9.1 Wrongful Convictions
In the present system, many people are wrongly convicted.
11.9.2 Oversupply of Law
Too many laws are made.
11.9.3 The Price of Justice
Governmental justice systems are unreasonably expensive and time-consuming.
11.9.4 The Failure of Imprisonment
Imprisonment leads to prisoner abuse and high rates of recidivism.
11.9.5 Reform or Anarchy?
Governments are slow to reform for reasons inherent in the incentive structures of government-based systems. A shift to a free market model would make numerous improvements more likely.
11.10 Conclusion
Privatization of the legal system would result in higher quality, lower costs, and fewer defects in general than government-based legal systems.
12 War and Societal Defense
12.1 The Problem of Societal Defense
Some argue that only a government can protect society against other governments.
12.2 Non-governmental Defense
12.2.1 Guerilla Warfare
Guerilla warfare has proved surprisingly effective at expelling foreign occupiers.
12.2.2 The Difficulty of Conquering an Ungoverned
Territory
An invading army would face large costs in conquering and establishing government in an ungoverned territory.
12.2.3 Nonviolent Resistance
Nonviolent resistance has proved remarkably effective at ending governmental oppression.
12.2.4 Conclusions
An anarchic society has plausible means of defense against foreign invaders.
12.3 Avoiding Conflict
12.3.1 Natural Human Aggression
Some argue that war is inevitable due to natural human aggression, but this theory is not plausible.
12.3.2 Land and Resources
To avoid war, an anarchist society should be established in a region lacking unusually large concentrations of valuable resources, and lacking a history of territorial disputes.
12.3.3 Conflict Spirals and Intergovernmental Disputes
Most wars are caused by disputes between governments. These could be avoided by not having a government.
12.3.4 Power Relations
Many wars are caused by struggles between governments for international dominance. These could be avoided by not having a government.
12.3.5 The Liberal Democratic Peace
A society could avoid war by being surrounded by liberal democracies.
12.3.6 If You Desire War, Prepare for War
Military preparation does not prevent war. It increases the risk of war.
12.4 Avoiding Terrorism
12.4.1 The Terrorist Threat
The threat of terrorism may become serious in the future, due to the possibility of attacks using weapons of mass destruction.
12.4.2 The Roots of Terrorism
Terrorism almost always occurs in retaliation for government actions.
12.4.3 Violent and Nonviolent Solutions
The best way to avoid terrorism is to eschew policies that provoke it, rather than attempting to incapacitate all potential terrorists.
12.5 The Dangers of ‘National Security’
12.5.1 The Risk of Unjust Aggression
Maintenance of a standing army creates a risk that one’s government will commit unjust aggression.
12.5.2 The Risk of Global Disaster
Governmental militaries pose a risk of destroying the human species.
12.6 Conclusion
A governmental military is not necessary for security and may actually increase our danger.
13 From Democracy to Anarchy
13.1 Against Presentist Bias: The Prospects for Radical
Change
Radical social changes have occurred in the past and will probably occur more quickly in the future.
13.2 Steps toward Anarchy
13.2.1 Outsourcing Court Duties
A society could approach the privatization of the justice system by delegating certain court cases to private arbitrators. This process has already begun.
13.2.2 Outsourcing Police Duties
The move toward privatization of police functions is also underway. Governments have outsourced a few police duties to private security guard companies.
13.2.3 The End of Standing Armies
The end of standing armies may come about through a global cultural shift and a gradual ratcheting down of military forces.
13.2.4 The Rest of the Way
Once the military was eliminated and courts and police privatized, someone would probably figure out how to make the politicians go home.
13.3 The Geographical Spread of Anarchy
Anarchy is most likely to begin in small countries or parts of countries. If the results were promising, the idea would spread.
13.4 The Importance of Ideas
The eventual arrival of anarchy is plausible due to the long-run tendency of human knowledge to progress, and the influence of ideas on the structure of society.
13.5 Conclusion
13.5.1 The Argument of Part I
Authority is illusory.
13.5.2 The Argument of Part II
Society can function without government.
13.5.3 The Argument of this Chapter
Anarchy is attainable.
Thanks for the summary, Michael! Have you considered crossposting this post to the EA Forum? I can do it if you like.