The Fallacy of Subjectivism
Here is a little Q&A about subjectivism in philosophy.
Q: What is subjectivism?
Roughly, the view that reality depends on the observer.
Q: What is insane about this view?
Well, let me give you an example. The Earth, according to modern scientific evidence, was formed about 4.5 billion years ago. There were no conscious beings at that time,* and certainly no intelligent beings, so no observers. If reality depends on observers, then it follows that the Earth couldn’t have existed then.
Similarly, it would follow that when humans (and other conscious beings) go extinct, the rest of the universe will instantly blink out of existence. You know that's not true.
[*Assume there's no God. Most subjectivists don't believe in Him. If you think there were aliens, take an earlier time before the aliens evolved.]
Q: How would subjectivists respond to that argument?
Maybe they would say “Yep, the Earth didn’t exist before us. We created the universe by coming into existence ourselves.” Or maybe they would say,
“You’re wrongly assuming that time exists objectively. Actually, it is we who create time with our temporal concepts. From our present location we create all of spacetime, including the times when we don’t exist. So it’s true that ‘there was a time when we did not exist,’ because our current conceptual scheme says that it’s true.”
Reply: If that’s so, wouldn’t it also be that "reality doesn’t depend on observers" is true because our current conceptual scheme says that it’s true?
Q: What are the main arguments for subjectivism?
There is basically one argument. It goes something like this (cf. https://fakenous.net/?p=1112):
“We cannot know about anything except through our perceptions, concepts, or other representations. Therefore, we can only know things as we perceive/conceive/represent them, not things as they are in themselves. But obviously things-as-we-represent-them depend upon observers. So everything we can know about, or even refer to, depends on observers. So all efforts to talk about mind-independent reality are nonsensical.”
Subjectivists are usually much less clear than that, though, possibly because they are themselves insanely confused. Usually, there is a lot more vague abstraction and incomprehensible jargon that goes on for a long time.
Q: That argument was still too confusing for me. Can you simplify it?
Here is a shorter version that captures the logical essence of the argument:
(For any x) x cannot be represented without observers.
Therefore, (for any x) x cannot exist without observers.
Q: And what is wrong with that argument?
Um, it’s obviously invalid. Now, we could try adding a premise, like so:
x cannot be represented without observers.
x is identical with a representation of x.
Therefore, x cannot exist without observers.
We can all see that that is now valid. And that is the subjectivist’s real argument in some sense, except that they would never actually say (2) explicitly, because (2) is absurd. It’s not that they believe that representations are identical with their objects; it is that they systematically confuse representations with their objects.
So rather than stating (2), what they would do is use language that invites you to make that confusion.
Q: How does one go about inviting such a confusion?
Mostly by deploying unclear phrases that are ambiguous between two meanings, and then reasoning as if they were univocal.
An example is the expression “things as we perceive them”. One would assume that this refers to some category of things. But at the same time, it seemingly also refers to our perceptions of those things. So it invites us to confuse x with perceptions of x.
Here's an analogy. Suppose that I have $50 in my bank account. However, in order to impress the chicks, I lie about it and say I have $1,000,000. Question: How much money does “my bank account as I describe it” contain? One million. This makes it sound like there is something that contains a million dollars. But obviously there is no million dollars anywhere in the story. So the expression “my bank account as I describe it” just functions to invite confusion.
Q: Walk me through the problem with the first version of the argument for subjectivism.
Sure. Quoting from above:
“We cannot know about anything except through our perceptions, concepts, or other representations.”:
True.
“Therefore, we can only know things as we perceive/conceive/represent them, not things as they are in themselves.”:
This deploys the confused concept of “things as we perceive them”, or “… as we conceive them” or “… as we represent them”. If these expressions are taken to refer to the actual things that we perceive (etc.), then the statement is true (but then the next statement would not logically follow). If the expressions refer to our perceptions, concepts, or representations, then the statement is false and question-begging, for then it says that we only know our perceptions.
What’s true is that we only know the objects that we perceive. The argument asks you to confuse the objects that we perceive with our perceptions of those objects. That’s just the confusion discussed above: confusing x with a representation of x.
“But obviously things-as-we-represent-them depend upon observers.”:
Same confusion. Etc.
Q: Did Immanuel Kant make this confusion?
Constantly. He uses “appearances” simultaneously to refer to our mental representations of things (e.g., sensory experiences) and the objects of those representations (e.g., the things we perceive).
Q: Did Bishop Berkeley make this confusion?
Absofuckinglutely. He’s one of the great pioneers of the confusion. His use of “idea” embodies the confusion. His main argument for the impossibility of matter also makes the confusion in a more subtle way.
Q: How does Berkeley’s use of “idea” confuse representations with their objects?
Ideas are mental representations. E.g., an idea of a cat is a mental state that represents (is “of” or “about”, or “refers to”) a cat. The object of a representation is the thing that it represents, the thing it is of (in this case, the actual cat). That is the thing that one is aware of (if indeed the representation makes one aware of anything).
Berkeley, however, lays down as a self-evident premise that ideas themselves are always the immediate objects of our awareness. When we think, we are thinking about “ideas”; when we perceive, we perceive “ideas”; etc. This is essentially saying that all perceptions are perceptions of those very perceptions and nothing else.
From there, the rest of his philosophical system follows. But the starting point is a conceptual confusion. An idea of a cat is not about itself (it isn’t the idea of the idea); it is about the cat. Having an idea of a cat, accordingly, amounts to thinking about a cat; it does not amount to thinking about an idea.
Q: What was Berkeley’s main argument for the impossibility of matter?
It went something like this (Principles of Human Knowledge, sec. 23; my paraphrase):
If x is inconceivable, then x is impossible. (premise)
It is not possible to conceive of a thing that no one thinks of. (premise)
Explanation: if you conceive of x, then you’re thinking of it.
Therefore, [a thing that no one thinks of] is inconceivable. (From 2)
Therefore, [a thing that no one thinks of] is impossible. (From 1, 3)
If there were objective reality, then it would be possible for there to be things that no one thinks of. (From meaning of “objective”)
Therefore, there is no objective reality. (From 4, 5)
You might find (1) dubious and even question-begging. Why couldn’t there be things that we can’t conceive of, perhaps because we’re just not smart enough to understand them? Berkeley would defend his premise by saying something like this:
"By inconceivable, I mean the thing in principle could not be conceived of, no matter how smart someone was, because it would be contradictory to suppose that someone conceived of it."
This makes (1) more plausible. (Berkeley also confuses the idea that it’s contradictory to have someone conceive of x with the idea that x itself is contradictory.)
Q: And how is that argument confused?
Premise 2 has a scope ambiguity. The two readings are:
2a. Not possible: [For some x,y, (x conceives of y, and no one thinks of y)].
2b. Not possible: [For some x, (x conceives: {for some y, no one thinks of y})].
(It’s called a “scope ambiguity” because “conceives” takes a narrow scope in 2a [including only “y”], while it takes wide scope in 2b [including the “no one thinks of y” modifier within its scope].)
Reading 2a is required for premise 2 to be true; that’s the reading on which it’s a tautology.
However, reading 2b is required for step 3 (and hence the remainder of the argument) to follow.
Q: Okay, but how is that an example of confusing representations with their objects?
By confusing 2a with 2b, Berkeley is essentially confusing a fact about an object (that you’re thinking of it) with part of the content of your thought. He’s identifying your thinking about y with your thinking about (your thinking about y). This is essentially confusing the object with the representation of the object.
Q: How does this confusion entail idealism?
Simple answer: Suppose we confuse representations with their objects. Then we would confuse the physical world with a mental representation of the physical world. But a mental representation of the physical world is mind-dependent. Therefore, we would infer that the physical world is mind-dependent.
Read Berkeley for a fuller answer.
Q: What other ridiculous things would follow from this mistake?
Here’s one. Berkeley allowed two kinds of things to exist: minds, and ideas in the mind. But this was inconsistent. If he’d followed his arguments to their logical conclusion, he would have said that there are only ideas. Minds themselves could only be ideas (or nothing). He’d have to identify your mind with the idea of your mind. (This follows from the premises that whatever you can think about is an idea, and that you can think about a mind. Berkeley pathetically tried to avoid this by saying that we have only a “notion” of the mind rather than an “idea” [Principles, sec. 142].)
Here’s another one. There is actually nothing other than your own ideas. Other people only exist in your own mind. God Himself only exists (if at all) in your own mind. Etc.
Q: What? How do you get those last conclusions?
Take exactly the same arguments that subjectivists give about physical reality, and apply them to other people, God, or anything else. It’s only lack of courage that has stopped subjectivists from doing this, but the logic is the same.
Here’s a modified version of the argument for subjectivism that I gave at the start:
“I cannot know about anything except through my perceptions, concepts, or other representations. Therefore, I can only know things as I perceive/conceive/represent them, not things as they are in themselves. But obviously things-as-I-represent-them depend upon me. So everything I can know about, or even refer to, depends on me. So all efforts by me to talk about reality independent of me are nonsensical.”
Here’s the modified version of Berkeley’s argument:
If x is inconceivable to me, then x is impossible. (premise)
I cannot conceive of a thing that I do not think of. (premise)
Therefore, [a thing that I don’t think of] is inconceivable to me. (From 2)
Therefore, [a thing that I don’t think of] is impossible. (From 1, 3)
If there were reality outside of me, then it would be possible for there to be things that I don’t think of. (premise)
Therefore, there is no reality outside of me. (From 4, 5)
Perhaps you want to object to (1) because maybe there are some possibilities that I am not smart enough to conceive of. However, this is perfectly parallel to the objection that you could make to the original version, and we could give a reply perfectly parallel to Berkeley’s:
“By inconceivable to me, I mean that I could not in principle conceive of the thing, no matter how smart I was, because it would be contradictory to suppose that I conceived of it.”
Q: Any other ridiculous consequences?
You can also construct structurally parallel arguments to “show” that nothing exists independent of words.
“We cannot talk about anything except through words. Therefore, we can only discuss things as we describe them, not things as they are in themselves. But obviously things-as-we-describe-them depend upon words. So everything we can discuss depends on words. So all efforts to talk about reality independent of words are nonsensical.”
Notice that that is exactly parallel to the original version of the argument for subjectivism. Next, Berkeley’s argument:
If x is indescribable, then x is impossible. (premise)
It is impossible to describe a thing that there are no words for. (premise)
Therefore, [a thing that there are no words for] is indescribable. (From 2)
Therefore, [a thing that there are no words for] is impossible. (From 1, 3)
If there were reality independent of words, then it would be possible for there to be things that there are no words for. (premise)
Therefore, there is no reality independent of words. (From 4, 5)
Again, you might think that (1) in this version is false. Why can’t there be things that no one can state? But this is parallel to the objection to Berkeley’s premise: why can’t there be things that no one can conceive? And the reply would be parallel to Berkeley’s reply:
“By indescribable, I mean the thing in principle could not be described, no matter how good our language was, because it would be contradictory to suppose that someone described it.”
That’s about equally plausible as Berkeley’s defense of his own premise.
Conclusion: If subjectivism in general is true, then all of reality is dependent upon my words.
It has been said that there is no thesis so absurd that some philosopher has not said it. Yet to the best of my knowledge, no one has taken up the above thesis. There are, that is, no linguistic solipsists in the history of philosophy.