From Epistemic to Moral Realism

Here is an interesting discussion of moral realism: http://peasoup.us/…/jmp-discussion-of-spencer-cases-from-e…/

Summary:
Moral Realism: the idea that there are objective moral values.
Epistemic Realism: the idea that there are objective facts about when a belief is justified, rational, etc.

CU-Boulder grad Spencer Case gives an argument something like this (this is my simplification):

1. Epistemic judgments are intertwined with moral judgments. Ex.:
a. Whether a belief is justified or not depends upon what evidence a person has available (not just what things they are explicitly thinking of at the moment). But whether some evidence counts as "available" depends in part on the costs of accessing that information, possibly including moral costs.
b. Whether a belief counts as justified depends on whether the subject did sufficient investigation, which depends in part on whether the subject could reasonably have been expected to do more investigation, which can be in part a moral issue.

2. So epistemic realism is true only if moral realism is true.

3. Epistemic realism is true.
Comment: It may be self-defeating to deny this.

4. So moral realism is true.

I think this is a pretty good argument.